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THE PERSON IN RELIGION
AN EXAMINATION OF CHRISTIANITY'S
CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY
OF THOUGHT

A THESIS
IN PHILOSOPHY
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FOREWORD

If the problem which we envisage in these chapters seem to stretch out far beyond the scope of so short and limited a study, may it be understood that there is sought here little more than a formulation of the problem, the indication of a tendency of thought. Into it the writer has entered with a deep feeling of reverence and a very real sense of humility, born of many limitations and inadequacies.

We live in the dawn of a new experience of religious feeling and insight. There is need, more than all else, of a new philosophical interpretation of this far-reaching human experience in relation to the rest of life. What St. Augustine did for Christianity in the light of Platonic idealism, what St. Thomas accomplished in his reinterpretation of the popular Aristotelianism, must be done for our own day in the light of modern science. Perhaps, therefore, even the smallest and least significant contributions to this end may help to hasten the day which shall bring a new prophet to reformulate Christian philosophy.

The writer desires to acknowledge here her very deep indebtedness and gratitude to those who have guided and helped her,—to the late Dr. William Romaine Newbold, who gave so much of his scholarship and thought to the problems of Christian philosophy, and whose life was itself a revelation of the meaning of Christianity; to Dr. Isaac Husik, who placed at her disposal the results of his own fine work in the field of medieval philosophy, and to Dr. Edgar A. Singer, under whose inspiration and guidance new and adventurous paths of thought have been opened up and explored.

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I

THE PERSON AS A REALITY OF IRREPLACEABLE VALUE

It has been said that the whole history of Western philosophy is little more than a record of the successive recurrences of two great systems of thought, the Platonic and the Aristotelian. There is indeed much of truth in this assertion; for the influence of Plato marks a direct line of descent through the long tradition of the Academy, to Philo, to Plotinus, to Augustine, through the latter to many others, including Descartes and the Rationalists, and finally to the Hegelians and other contemporary schools of Idealism. Aristotle's influence, on the other hand, has been no less significant. The philosophers of Arabic and Jewish Spain, Scholasticism in Latin Europe, the masters of logic in every age, and the whole spirit of modern science,—all are profoundly indebted to the genius of *the Philosopher*, as the Middle Ages called him.

There is, however, a third factor,—it can scarcely be called a philosophy,—which has been as significant, if not more significant than these in the moulding of Western thought. This is the Christian tradition, which, if it lack the precise formulation of other philosophic systems, has contributed nevertheless, quite apart from its devotional and ethical teaching, certain radically new and significant ideas that have changed and redirected the whole current of speculative thought. It is with one of these, perhaps the most radical and far-reaching in its implications, that we are concerned in this study,—the concept of human personality, not as a “vague and insubstantial shadow,” as some have characterized it, but as a reality of infinitely precious and irreplaceable value.

It was this insight of the Master who taught to Gallilean peasants his simple and momentous doctrine, this broad and deep human sympathy and understanding which drew to the warmth of his friendship all sorts and conditions of men, and

which amazed and offended his contemporaries. The line of demarcation between social castes and classes was as absolute in the Palestine of Christ's day as it was elsewhere in the ancient world. That a religious teacher of the Jews, therefore, should seek fellowship with outcasts and publicans was a matter of no little scandal to his fellow Jews; but that he should find the grace of a true religious character growing spontaneously in the heart of one of another race (the Roman centurion, for example, or even the good Samaritan), must have been indeed beyond their power to conceive. "Who is my neighbor?" asked the master of Jewish sacred law, and from his own lips the reluctant answer is forced: "He that shewed mercy," though he were but a despised Samaritan.¹

Yet it is just this perception of the intrinsic value of each and every individual, no matter how lowly and unlovely, this recognition of the person without reference to class or condition or race, that has characterized and distinguished Christianity, throughout its long history, from all other expressions of religious faith. We find the thought recurrent continually throughout the Gospels. Thus in Matthew the parable of the lost sheep: "If a man have a hundred sheep and one of them be gone astray, doth he not leave the ninety and nine, and goeth into the mountains, and seeketh that which is gone astray? And if so be that he find it, verily I say unto you, he rejoiceth more of that sheep, than of the ninety and nine which went not astray. Even so it is not the will of our Father which is in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish."²

Every Christian, therefore, must see his fellows with this same depth of insight; for the final judgment of the Master whom he serves shall be: "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me."³

It is this ideal which has inspired at all times the missionary spirit of Christianity, and laid the foundation for that conception of a universal society and fellowship, transcending racial and national boundaries, the *Civitas Dei* or Catholic Church. It was

¹ *Luke* 10: 29-37; cf. also *Luke* 7: 9; *Gal.* 2 (all); *Gal.* 3: 26-29; *Col.* 3: 11.

² *Matthew* 18: 12-14.

³ *Matthew* 25: 40.

a notion difficult indeed of understanding and acceptance for even the sincerest of early Christians. Peter was the first, in the Jewish-Christian community of Palestine, to envisage the new doctrine as a truly catholic or universal one. They are very significant words, therefore, with which he addresses Cornelius, the first of the Gentile converts: "Ye know how that it is an unlawful thing for a man that is a Jew to keep company, or come unto one that is of another nation; but God has shewed me that I should not call any man common or unclean."⁴

The new faith in man thus delivered to the saints was destined to be preserved in the face of many heresies, which flourished from the very beginning of her history. These represented most often old systems of Pagan thought, that were by their very nature hostile to the new ideal;—thus Gnosticism, with its loss of individuality in the mystical possession of *γνῶσις*; Arianism, Apollinarianism, Sabellianism and the Nestorian heresy, all of which end in a depreciation or negation of the true personality of the Christ. Each in its turn was discredited as hostile to the spirit of Christianity, though the faith thus kept was sometimes at the cost of a living martyrdom, like that of the saint who stood alone against Arianism, *Athanasius contra mundum*.

It is true that the accepted doctrines of the church have not always remained faithful to the spirit of this ideal, and many incompatible elements have crept in from time to time. But marvel it is that so new a principle and one so fundamentally opposed to the point of view of Roman imperialism and Mediaeval feudalism should have stood the test of time. Yet it did endure that test, and emerged completely triumphant when at length the "Heavenly City," the fellowship of the Church, found expression in a new political and social doctrine, the ideal of democracy, a conception of universal brotherhood and fellowship, which is born in very truth of the spirit of the Catholic Church, and seeks,—by rising above racial and national loyalties, which submerge the individual spirit in that of the group,—to make possible for every man the development of that divine promise which the insight of the Master found implicit in every human heart.

Acts 10: 28.

How different this conception is, not only from the currently accepted ideas of Judaism in Christ's own day, but from all primitive and pagan types of thinking (including those of Plato and Aristotle), we shall see in the following chapter. If then we compare such views with two later developments of Christian thought, the philosophy of St. Augustine and that of St. Thomas Aquinas—St. Augustine a follower of Plato, St. Thomas a Peripatetic—we may hope perhaps to arrive at some fairly clear conception and definite understanding of the meaning of personality from the Christian point of view.

II

THE PERSON IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMITIVE AND PAGAN THINKING

The word *person*, as we conceive it, is the outgrowth of a long history of gradually developing ideas. During the major part of this history of development, the notion of the individual or person as a real and independent entity, apart from his family or social environment, was for the most part undreamed of. We have only to consider the meaning of the word in its Greek and Latin forms to realize that this is so. The Greek *πρόσωπον*, for example, has for its earliest significance the face or countenance, and conveys the same quality of meaning as the English *phase* or *aspect*, that is, external appearance. Again in the drama we find a development of this meaning in the case of the mask used in a play. The mask, it will be remembered, was in part at least a result of the natural features of the Greek theatre, with the tremendous space which it covered and the vast throngs that congregated there for the festivals.¹ No merely human voice and figure could hope to be heard and seen at the farthest outposts of that great amphi-theatre, and so we find the stately and heroic form (achieved by the use of stilts and other mechanical devices), with its concealing mask, behind which the actor played his part, and without which his own unaided powers would not have proved sufficient. But these masks were necessarily stereotyped. There were masks of tragedy and those of comedy, masks of old men and of young heroes, of tragic women and of laughing happy youth, each presenting a type of human experience, a pattern of thought and feeling, rather than a real and living individual.²

¹ The use of the mask does indeed antedate the classical drama, having been used even in the earliest and most primitive celebrations held in honor of the god Dionysos.

² *Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines*: (Paris 1877), Vol. IV, p. 408—"Pour nous représenter les masques tragiques de Sophocle et d'Euripide, c'est donc aux idéales figures, aux types supérieurs d'humanité qui peuplent les frontons du Parthénon qu'il nous faut penser Des lèvres en-

Another meaning arises when the word comes to signify no longer merely a mask, but a part or rôle which is being presented upon the stage, a character of the play. Here, too, we are still dealing with a type or pattern of character, not the intensely real and unique personalities of the Shakespearean stage, for example,—a Lady Macbeth, a Shylock, or a puzzled and vacillating Hamlet,—but magnificent super-men and super-women, invested with heroic virtues and vices, whose tragic life and destiny are, indeed, well calculated to inspire us with a “feeling of pity and fear,” but not with that swift sympathy and understanding which we give to Shakespeare’s characters. Romantic drama, being more nearly true, perhaps, to its original source and inspiration, Christianity, has sought to present real persons, idealizing but not destroying the force of their individuality; while the classical drama, even in its modern forms, retains its allegiance to the heroic, to symbol and to allegory.

We have but to compare the sustained level of epic grandeur in the adventures of the heroic Cid with the bitter heart searchings and hesitations of the unhappy Hamlet. It is true that in both these plays the problem is much the same, the struggle between personal rights and happiness and the duties of filial piety. In both it is the latter which wins the day, yet the struggle is very different. For Chimène and Don Rodrigue, as for Antigone in Greek tragedy, the end is predestined from the beginning. Being such as they are, each could not choose but to obey the divine law of family loyalty. Yet it is a cold and formal thing, this inescapable bond of duty to the memory of a murdered father or a slain and unburied brother; while in Hamlet we find a more uncertain spirit, noble and yet frail, torn in a bitter struggle between passionate love and hate, between a sense of human futility and the beauty and holiness of an intimate

tr’ouvertes (juste assez pour laisser à la voix un libre passage), un ou deux plis sur le front et entre les sourcils, quelques touches de couleur accentuant le modelé, voilà sans doute, dans ces figures majestueuses et sereines, tout ce qui était donné à la traduction des affections de l’âme.”

Ibid., p. 409—“Tous les masques dont il vient d’être question sont des masques de caractères. Chacun d’eux représente non un individu, mais un *type*. L’homme rasé (ὁ ξυρίας), par exemple, comme nous l’avons dit, le masque du vieux Priam, c’était en même temps celui de tous les personnages qui lui ressemblaient par l’âge, par la condition sociale, par l’état de l’âme.”

human relationship, which is governed not by duty but by love.³

For the Latin, as for the Greek, there is this same history of development in the meaning of the word *persona*, which signified first of all a mask. Then it too came to designate the characters, *dramatis personae*, who appear upon the stage. Later it was transferred by analogy, and in a consciously figurative sense, to one who plays his part in the great drama of life, where

“All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players:”

This conception of the meaning of life as a stage leads to another application of the word *persona*, whereby it denotes a man recognized by his fellows as playing a special and important rôle in civic affairs, a personage as we say.⁴ Finally, in accordance with the peculiar genius of Roman jurisprudence and citizenship, this word was used to designate one who had come to have certain recognized political rights and obligations in the eyes of the law and of the state. Such a one was thus distinguished from an alien, a slave or any other inferior being.⁵ But it was not until the post-Augustan age, not indeed until after the birth and spread of Christianity in the Pagan world, that the word *persona* came to signify, in anything like our modern sense, a unique individual or person.

If we turn back to the beginnings of human culture, we shall find that the earliest and most primitive forms of thinking are animistic. Every tree, every flower, every stone is for the animist a living thing, possessed of a spirit as real as man’s own, so that the tree or corn when cut down must be propitiated, just as the spirit of a human or animal victim must be placated after death, and the eating of first fruits becomes thus a sacrificial or religious feast. The science that springs from animism is magic, and especially in sympathetic magic, one may easily

³ It is true that Corneille does not carry his theme to a tragic conclusion as did Sophocles. His insight recognized the far reaching effect of the problem he had raised, and in his wisdom he leaves its solution to the reader.

⁴ Cf. the English word *parson*.

⁵ Cf. J. B. Bailie, Introduction to Hegel’s *Phenomenologie des Geistes*, Vol. II, ch. on Condition or Right or Legal Status, p. 478.

trace a connection of ideas between the assumption that "things act on each other at a distance through a secret sympathy, the impulse being transmitted from one to the other by means of what we may conceive as a kind of invisible ether . . ." ⁶ and the animistic notion of a great world principle of life, to be found in every individual manifestation of nature. This monistic or pantheistic conception of life is not necessarily a consciously formulated one, but it is implied in primitive man's symbolic sacrifices, and in his practice of vicarious substitution. The following extract from Frazer's *Golden Bough* illustrates this assumption very well

"When a band of Carib Indians from the Orinoco had gone on the war-path, their friends left in the village used to calculate as nearly as they could the exact moment when the absent warriors would be advancing to attack the enemy. Then they took two lads, laid them down on a bench, and inflicted a most severe scourging on their bare backs. This the youths submitted to without a murmur, supported in their sufferings by the firm conviction, in which they had been bred from childhood, that on the constancy and fortitude with which they bore the cruel ordeal depended the valor and success of their comrades in the battle."⁷

The primitive philosophy which underlies this strange custom is unquestionably one which makes of every individual a type representative of the family or tribe, so that by suffering or dying in his own person, he may remove the danger of suffering and death from his fellows. An individual more or less is a thing of no great moment or value, so long as the welfare and happiness of the tribe or clan may be preserved. Hence the universality of human sacrifice, or at a later stage of development the substitution of animal victims, whose blood, shed vicariously, carried with it a purification and atonement for human sin and suffering. The individual soul is considered immortal, to be sure, but in a vague and shadowy way. Even in life it lacks unity, and is a tenuous and much divided substance, inhering partly in the placenta at birth, partly in the man's shadow, his

⁶ J. G. Frazer, *Golden Bough*, p. 12.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

name, his breath and even in lost particles of hair or nails, since these latter in the hands of an enemy may cause his illness or death.

The series of taboos, restrictions and regulations which grow out of this theory must indeed have laid upon the individual a burden of family and tribal custom and superstition, whose weight was "heavy as death and deep almost as life. . . ."

"The old notion that the savage is the freest of mankind," says Frazer, "is the reverse of the truth. He is a slave, not indeed to a visible master, but to the past, to the spirits of his dead forefathers, who haunt his steps from birth to death, and rule him with a rod of iron. What they did is the pattern of right, the unwritten law to which he yields a blind and unquestioning obedience. The least possible scope is thus afforded to superior talent to change old customs for the better. The ablest man is dragged down by the weakest and dullest, who necessarily sets the standard, since he cannot rise, while the other can fall. The surface of such a society presents a uniform dead level, so far as it is humanly possible to reduce the natural inequalities, the immeasurable real differences of inborn capacity and temper, to a false superficial appearance of equality."⁸

But certain individuals did break away, by virtue often of superior magical powers, and their consequent value to the community. Thus the medicine man or magician of a tribe frequently rose to be its chief or king, his art having gained for him great favor, or aroused great fear among his people. Such became indeed the hero kings, half human half divine, and at their death their names were often identified with some one of the local deities of nature, as was the case with Osiris and Adonis. From this comes the notion of the divine right of kings, and in India to this day, as well as in more primitive communities, "every king is regarded as little short of a present god," so that the *Law Book of Manu* commands that "even an infant king must not be despised from an idea that he is a mere mortal; for he is a great deity in human form."⁹

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 100. Cf., W. D. Wallis, *Messiahs Christian and Pagan*. That the individual is the initiator of each forward movement in the course of progress is, from the point of view of the modern interpreter of social evolution, clear

Yet even here we have no true recognition of the value and rights of the individual human life as such; for, as Frazer shows, the custom of killing a king in his prime, before the weakness and deterioration of old age may lessen his beneficent powers over the life of the tribe, is one of almost universal occurrence in savage life. For example:

"In the Central African kingdom of Bunyoro down to recent years custom required that as soon as the king fell seriously ill or began to break up from age, he should die by his own hand; for according to an old prophecy, the throne would pass away from the dynasty if ever the king were to die a natural death. He killed himself by draining a poisoned cup. If he faltered or were too ill to ask for the cup, it was his wife's duty to administer the poison."¹⁰

By this act the spirit of the dead king, still full of power and vigor, is supposed to pass into the body of his successor, so that he too becomes divine. Hence the doctrine of *metempsychosis*,—which while it seems to offer a hope of personal immortality, is really destructive of any intrinsic personal value that the individual may be thought to have. For a spirit which belongs equally to a long line of successive incarnations is not an individual soul at all, but a group or communal one. For this reason those who profess it are most likely to end in fatalism; the individual will, being futile and of little or no importance, makes a virtue of its necessity by submitting to the will of the *All*, and effacing its own life in that of the universal soul.

The doctrine of *metempsychosis* has been embodied in more than one highly developed system of thought, notably that of Plato and the old Brahmanic philosophy. In the latter the element of fatalism is very clearly defined, while in Plato the day is saved—so far as freedom and necessity are concerned—by his introduction of a principle of dualism and the dynamic quality

enough. For primitive and ancient thought, however, it was not so clear. The individual—even the *messiah*—was for them a type representative of the family, the state or even the whole human race, but not a unique and irreplaceable reality. Even Christian theology, particularly, in the doctrine of the Atonement, is sometimes deeply imbued with this Platonic notion of type and archetype, in dealing with divine personality.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

of his ethics, the struggle of man toward the *good*. Here we have the essential and inherent contrast that lies between Eastern and Western thought: in the one a self-negation, a quiescent yielding of the individual soul to absorption and extinction in Brahma, the world-spirit; in the other a constant struggle and search, which leads the individual on into an ever richer and fuller experience of life.

But this notion of the end of the struggle, this richer and fuller life, is one which opens itself to many and varied interpretations. Of these there is one, which, true to the old traditional view, makes the *All* or world-spirit the supreme and final reality. It does, however, retain for the individual soul a more nearly real, though lesser and dependent value; for in such a system each man finds his happiness and realizes truly his destiny only as he becomes an organic part of the whole. He is, therefore, to the larger entity as an organ of the body to the man. This is the view of Plato, and we should do well, therefore, to study it more fully.

To begin with, the human spirit for Plato corresponds not to a single and unified concept, but to a threefold hierarchy of being: first, the appetitive soul, the basest part of our nature; second, the passionate soul or *spirit*, the realm of the emotions and courage; and last, the noblest part of all, the divine and immortal *Nous*. And so we find in the *Timaeus* that "they (the gods) imitating him (the creator), received from him the immortal principle of the soul; and around this they fashioned a mortal body, and made the whole body to be a vehicle of the soul, and constructed within a soul of another nature which was mortal, subject to terrible and irresistible affections: first of all, pleasure, the greatest incitement of evil; then pain, which deters from good; also rashness and fear, foolish counsellors, anger implacable, and hope easily deceived by sense without reason and by all-daring love; these they mingled together according to necessary laws, and framed man. Wherefore, fearing to pollute the divine any more than is necessary, they separated the mortal nature, and gave that a habitation in another part of the body, placing the neck between them to be the isthmus and boundary line, which they constructed between the head

and the breast, that they might be kept distinct." . . . "That part of the inferior soul which is endowed with courage and spirit and loves contention, they settled nearer the head, in the interval between the midriff and the neck" . . . and "the part of the soul which desires meats and drinks and such things as the bodily frame needs, they placed between the midriff and the naval, contriving in all this region a sort of manger for the food of the body; and there they bound the desires down as a wild animal which was chained up with man and must be nourished if man was to exist."¹¹

Such then is the tripartite division of the soul as we find it described in the *Timaeus*. It is brought about of course by the dual nature of reality assumed by Plato,—on the one hand mind or reason, on the other necessity or matter. But the union of these two mutually irreconcilable elements requires the assumption of a third nature as a kind of connecting link or middle term, which unites the qualities of each of the others and makes their union possible. The psychology of Plato lacks, therefore, a complete and satisfying principle of unity for the individual soul.

Again the human soul finds its nature reflected in the larger and more perfect entities, first of the state or polity and then of the cosmos itself. For the state,—the ideal republic at least,—is likewise composed of three parts: a lowest or artisan class, corresponding to our appetitive nature, a higher or warrior class, who reflect the quality of spirit or courage, and last the governors or guardians, the noblest and highest class of all, whose function, like that of reason, is to rule.¹² Thus the state is a kind of larger man, the *Leviathan* of Hobbes, and only as he finds and fulfills his civic duties, whether they be those of the artisan, the warrior or the ruler, does the individual vindicate his right to exist.

But not only is he thus a citizen of the state, he is a citizen of a yet higher entity, the cosmos, and this too is a threefold living being. For the Creator: "finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly manner,

¹¹ Plato, *Timaeus*, (Jowett's translation): Vol. II. p. 561-562.

¹² *Republic*, Book II.

out of disorder he brought order, considering that this was far better than the other. . . . For these reasons he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, and framed the universe to be the best and fairest work in the order of nature. And therefore, using the language of probability, we may say that the *world became a living soul* and truly rational through the providence of God."¹³

The universe is then an animal or organism, but an animal whose form is that of a perfect sphere. At the circumference we have a region of the "motion of the same," the home of reason itself, of the divine and eternal essences or ideas of Beauty, Truth and Good. Within this is that circle which Plato calls the "motion of the other," "the realm of eternity's "moving image"—time—where are the sun, the moon, and the habitation of the blessed gods. This is the middle term within the cosmic soul. Last comes the sublunar region of the universe, the world of our human experience, a world of constant flux and change, where nothing rests or stays, and all things are forever becoming, (the *πάντα ῥεῖ* of Heraclitus). This owes its nature to matter or space,—“the mother and receptacle of all created and visible, and in any way sensible things, . . . an invisible and formless being which receives all things and attains in an extraordinary way a portion of the intelligible, and is most incomprehensible.”¹⁴

This anthropomorphic or organic conception of the universe gives, as we have seen, a certain reality to the individual or person, but a limited and relative one. The Christian teaching, that the soul of even the lowliest and most sinful of men is infinitely precious and worthy of divine grace, is a notion which Plato could not have admitted, nor even perhaps conceived. For while his philosophy comes closer indeed to the spirit of Christianity than that of any other pagan system—and this has always been recognized—yet a jarring note is sometimes struck, and nowhere more noticeably and more forcibly than in this question of the value of the person. Thus in the *Republic*,

¹³ *Timaeus*, p. 525.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 543.

as Socrates and Glaucon are discussing the qualities of an ideal citizen, we find this extraordinary recommendation:

"Our politic Asclepius," says Socrates, "exhibited the power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy constitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment; such as these he cured by purgations and operations, and bade them live as usual, and in this consulted the interests of the State; but bodies which disease had penetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure by gradual processes of evacuation and infusion: he did not want to lengthen out useless lives, or to raise up puny offspring to an enfeebled sire; if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had no business to cure him; this was all in the interest of the State."¹⁵
... "This is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you will sanction. They will be healing arts to better natures in their souls and in their bodies; but the worse nature or constitution they will in the case of the body leave to die, and the diseased and incurable soul they will put to death themselves.

This is clearly best for them and for the State."¹⁶

Far indeed from this highly efficient, if somewhat heartless policy, is our own instinctive feeling for the sacredness of human life.

The philosophy of Plato leads ultimately into mysticism. The struggle of the soul toward the good, brings with it a final escape from the things of sense—this lower world of matter and constant change—until at last after many incarnations, the enranchised spirit soars to those empyrean heights whence first it came, and there caught up and absorbed in the contemplation of Beauty, Truth and Good in their essence, it feasts through all eternity upon this indescribable glory. This aspect of Plato's philosophy became the inspiration of Plotinus. In the Neo-Platonic development of the system, however, the irreconcilable element of dualism, with its struggle between good and evil in the cosmic and human soul, is replaced by a more completely rationalistic doctrine of monism, by which the world in all its forms is viewed as a pure and unmixed

¹⁵ *Republic*, p. 232.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

emanation of God, the ineffable *One*. Thus the reality of the individual becomes even more attenuated and negative; the end of the soul's progress is no longer a contemplation of divinity, but absorption and extinction in the nature of the *All*.

If, however, we turn now to Aristotle's system, we find a fundamentally different point of view. Plato regarded the transcendent form or *idea* as the only true reality, the things of sense being, as we have seen, an ever flowing, ever changing imitation of these eternal natures. But to the Aristotelian temper such a solution of the problem of reality was fundamentally uncongenial. For Plato's disciple, though he followed in no small part the teachings of his master, was by nature an empiricist and not a mystic. To him the concrete object of sense was a primary datum and must be reckoned with. He sets out, therefore, in the *Metaphysics* upon an enquiry into the precise nature of such realities. After considering all the qualities which may be predicated of any one of them, we must, he tells us, come finally upon one which characterizes that particular class of objects alone. This will correspond to the "last difference,"¹⁷ given in their definition, the *οὐσία* or specific form, as opposed to the matter or genus. This form is in reality a principle or cause,¹⁸ and it is this which unifies and makes the individual distinct:

"Now in the case of that which is compounded out of something, so that the resulting whole has unity,—is not put together as a heap, that is, but rather as a syllable,—we find that this is not the same as its component parts; *e. g.*, the syllable *βα* is not identical with *β* and *α*, nor is flesh no more than fire and earth. For if the compound be destroyed, the whole (*i. e.*, flesh or syllable) no longer exists, but the elements go on existing (*i. e.*, letters, fire and earth). Therefore the syllable itself is a real something, not merely the combined letters, the vowel and the consonant, but something different from these. Flesh, too, is not merely fire and earth, or the hot and the cold, but something different from these its elements. Since, therefore, this "something different" (= *x*) must be either an element or composed of elements, if on the

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (Bonitz, Berlin Edition), 1038 a 25–26. "ἐὰν μὲν δὴ διαφορὰ διαφορὰ γίγνηται, μία ἔσται ἡ τελευταία τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ οὐσία."

¹⁸ The "final cause"—called in natural objects a *φύσις*."

one hand x be an element, we shall face the same logical difficulty as before. For we shall have to say that flesh is composed of fire and earth and x and something else ($=y$) and so on *ad infinitum*. If, on the other hand, x be a compound, it is clear that it will have to be a compound not of one but of several elements; otherwise (if it were composed of only one) it would itself be that one, so that again we should use the same argument as in the case of flesh or the syllable. So it would seem that x is an independent reality, not an element, and it is the cause of *this* thing's being flesh and *that* thing's being a syllable. The same is true moreover in all other cases. X then is the substance of each individual thing, for it is the first cause of its being. But since some things are not substances, but only such are substances as are formed by and in accordance with a nature, it would seem that the substance is this nature, which is not an element but a principle."¹⁹

There is an extraordinary degree of insight in this analysis of Aristotle's concerning the principle of unity and individuation, which is well in accord with our modern view. For a thing is indeed more than the sum of its parts, and however carefully we may describe the composition of these, we shall not explain the new entity which springs from their union, the thing itself. The notion that such an entity is the result of a certain integrating principle or law finds its parallel in the law of relatedness accepted by modern science.²⁰

Aristotle, therefore, brings the form or *idea* down from the skies and incorporates it as a moving principle of things as we know them. It is not itself an element of the thing, as in the case of the Platonic *nous*, but it is a force which unifies and integrates and makes the individual one. Its existence, however, is never in any real sense independent of the matter in

¹⁹ *Metaphysics*, 1041 b 12–31. “ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τίνος σύνθετον οὕτως ὥστε ἔν ἐστιν τὸ πᾶν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς σωρὸς ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡ συλλαβή, ἡ δὲ συλλαβὴ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ στοιχεῖα, οὐδὲ τὸ βα ταῦτὸ τῷ β καὶ α, οὐδ’ ἡ σὰρξ πῦρ καὶ γῆ· διαλυθέντων γὰρ τὰ μὲν οὐκέτι ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ συλλαβὴ τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἔστι, καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ γῆ· ἔστιν ἄρα τι ἡ συλλαβή, οὐ μόνον τὰ στοιχεῖα τὸ φωνῆεν καὶ ἄφωνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι. καὶ ἡ σὰρξ οὐ μόνον πῦρ καὶ γῆ ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι· εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη κάκεῖνο ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ στοιχείων εἶναι, εἰ μὲν στοιχεῖον, πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται λόγος· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ αἱ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ἔσται ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἔτι ἄλλου, ὥστ’ εἰς ἀπειρον βαδιέεται· εἰ δ’ ἐκ στοιχείου, δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ πλειόνων, ἡ ἐκείνο αὐτὸ ἔσται, ὥστε πάλιν ἐπὶ τούτου τὸν αὐτὸν ἐροῦμεν λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σαρκὸς ἢ συλλαβῆς. δόξειε δ’ ἂν εἶναι τι τοῦτο καὶ οὐ στοιχεῖον, καὶ αἰτιὸν γε τοῦ εἶναι τοδὶ μὲν σάρκα τοδὶ δὲ συλλαβὴν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐσία δ’ ἐκάστου μὲν τούτο· τούτο γὰρ αἰτιον πρῶτον τοῦ εἶναι· ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔνια οὐκ οὐσίαι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλ’ ὅδαι οὐσίαι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φύσει συνεστήκασιν, φανείη ἂν καὶ αὕτη ἡ φύσις οὐσία, ἡ ἔστιν οὐ στοιχεῖον ἀλλ’ ἀρχή.”

²⁰ Cf. R. G. Gordon, *Personality*, p. 31.

which it inheres. "In all cases the immediate causes are the actual given individual, representing the form, and another individual which exists as a potency. The universal causes, therefore, of which we spoke do not exist. For the individual is the cause of other individuals; for mankind is universally speaking the cause of mankind, but there is no such thing as a universal man."²¹ Thus the focus of attention in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is centered upon the individual as such.

Whether, however, one individual is said to be distinguished in any essential way from all others of the species, whether, that is, the concept of personality has any significance in Aristotle's system is quite another matter and one not easily determined. In the *Politics* he seems on the whole to follow the Platonic tradition. Yet even here, especially in his criticism of the *Republic*, we find a real difference in point of view. Thus (in Book II), discussing the community of women and children, advocated by Socrates in the dialogue, Aristotle makes this significant comment:

"Is it not apparent that a state, as it tends to become more and more unified, tends to become no longer a state; since *the state is by its very nature a plurality*; and as each becomes more and more unitary, we have a family instead of a state, and an individual rather than a family. For we may say that the family is more of a unit than the state, and the individual more of a unit than the family; so that even if it were possible to effect such unity, it ought not to be done, since it would destroy the state."²²

Thus the state, being less of a unity than is the individual, becomes, we may infer from our study of the *Metaphysics*, something less real than the individual. Aristotle does not

²¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1071 a 18-22. "πάντων δὴ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα πρῶτον, τὸ εἶδει, καὶ ἄλλο ὃ δυνάμει. ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὖν τὰ καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καθόλου· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὐθείς, . . ."

²² *Politics*, 1261 a 16-22. "καίτοι φανερόν ἐστιν ὡς προϊούσα καὶ γινομένη μία μάλλον οὐδὲ πόλις ἔσται· πλῆθος γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, γινομένη τε μία μάλλον οἰκία μὲν ἐκ πόλεως, ἄνθρωπος δ' ἐξ οἰκίας ἔσται· μάλλον γὰρ μίαν τὴν οἰκίαν τῆς πόλεως φαίμεν ἂν, καὶ τὸν ἕνα τῆς οἰκίας· ὥστ' εἰ καὶ δυνατός τις εἴη τοῦτο δρᾶν, οὐ ποιητέον· ἀναιρήσει γὰρ τὴν πόλιν."—Aristotle is at the same time, however, a true Platonist;—cf. *Pol.* I, 2, p. 1253 a 18-26: "ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος, δῆλον."

actually make this inference, it is true, and it is doubtful whether he would have accepted it entirely.²² Yet the very fact that the issue is raised shows a tendency of thought and insight very different from that of Plato.

Again in this same defense of the rights of individual ownership and the normal ties of family life, he raises another most significant question which points in the same direction. The common possession of women and children, he tells us, would destroy the bonds of family love and the intimate affection which exists among its various members. "For there are two qualities which especially cause men to cherish and esteem a thing, namely that it is their own and that they love it; but neither of these qualities can exist in a state such as this (sc. of Plato's)."²³ It is obvious that he is referring here not to the bond of loyalty and duty;—for that was also obtainable in the Platonic republic,—but to a free and spontaneous affection, which more than any other thing perhaps strengthens the claims of individuality. This love, which in the life of the community we should call by the name of friendship or fellowship, is viewed as the "greatest good of states," since it preserves them from internal strife."²⁴

Again in his psychology, Aristotle seems to have passed beyond the bounds and limitations of Platonism. For the active intellect, as he describes it in the *De Anima*, comes very close to being what modern psychologists mean when they call personality the "integration" or "focal point" of consciousness. This active intellect or *νοῦς* is indeed of the same order as form in general, but we have in the psychology a more careful and systematic construction of the processes which enter into the individuation of mind than we found in the case of things. Thus after analyzing and classifying the field of experience into (1) the nutritive faculty, and (2) the faculty of sense, Aristotle assumes a *common sense* (*αἴσθησις κοινή*) or

²³ *Ibid.*, 1262 b 22–24: "ὁμο γὰρ ἔστιν ἃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κηδεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τό τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν· ὧν οὐδέτερον οἶόν τε ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὕτω πολιτευμένοις."

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 1262 b 7–8: "φιλίαν τε γὰρ οἴομεθα μέγιστον εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν . . ."

single faculty by which we compare and distinguish between sensations. For: "each of the senses perceives *per accidens* the proper objects of all the others, not as different perceptions, but as a single perception, whenever all these senses are focused at the same time upon the same object; as e. g., when one perceives that gall is bitter and yellow."²⁵ This faculty is resident within the soul itself and its response is not brought about directly by any external stimulus, nor has it any special organ, but it is the first stage in that independent and integrating functioning which characterizes the soul as such.²⁶

We find, moreover, that man and his nearer relatives of the animal world have reached a yet higher stage of development through the power of recalling sense images. This, the faculty of imagination, becomes ultimately in its potential character a kind of matrix, the passive intellect, upon which the active intellect, that supreme and noblest human faculty, focusing produces thought. "But since in all nature there is something which represents matter in each class (and this is potentially all the individuals of that class), and something else, called the cause or agent, inasmuch as it makes all the individuals, as e. g. art is actualized in its matter, of necessity these differences inhere also in the soul. And so there is one soul such that it becomes all things, and another such that it effects all things, like a kind of stored up energy (*ἔξις*), such as light." . . . "And this intellect is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its real nature a creative energy (*ἐνέργεια*)." . . . "This intellect, however, does not sometimes think and some-

²⁵ *De Anima* III, 425 a 30-425 b 2: "τὰ δ' ἀλλήλων ἴδια κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθάνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις, οὐχ ἧ αἱ αὐταί, ἀλλ' ἧ μία, ὅταν ἅμα γένηται ἡ αἰσθησις ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χολήν ὅτι πικρά καὶ ξανθή."

²⁶ For this whole discussion see 426 b 8-427 a 25. Cf. also Hick's introduction to the *De Anima*, p. 52. Cf. also the Kantian notion of *Verbindung*,—*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, note on B 202 (p. 257 Reklam):

"Die zweite Verbindung (nexus) ist die Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen, sofern es notwendig zueinander gehört, wie z. B. das Akzidens zu irgendeiner Substanz, oder die Wirkung zu der Ursache,—mithin auch als ungleichartig doch a priori verbunden vorgestellt wird, welche Verbindung, weil sie nicht willkürlich ist, ich darum dynamisch nenne, weil sie die Verbindung des Daseins des Mannigfaltigen betrifft, die wiederum in die physische der Erscheinungen untereinander, und metaphysische, ihre Verbindung im Erkenntnisvermögen a priori eingeteilt werden können."

times cease thinking. But it is only when separated that it realizes its true nature, and this alone is deathless and eternal."²⁷

Perhaps no other passage in all the works of Aristotle has been the subject of so many conjectures and the centre of so many controversies as these words we have just quoted. What is the passive intellect and what is the active (ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ παντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν)? Many and various indeed are the answers to that question offered by the commentators, ancient, mediaeval and modern. Alexander of Aphrodisias, for example, assumes that these two intellects (the active and passive) are entirely separate entities; he even posits a third, being as in Plato's philosophy, a kind of connecting link or middle term. This, the *intellectus in habitu*, which is a gradual growth from the pure potency of the passive principle, brought about by the process of actual thinking, is a kind of storehouse of ideas and objects of thought, (cf. the Greek *ἔξις*, like the Latin *habitus*, a "holding" or "storing"). The active intellect, however, is for Alexander a force supervening from the outside, and is identified with the Aristotelian "First Cause," that is, with God Himself. The active intellect is therefore a divine principle, foreign to man's proper nature,—yet it is with him from birth to death. It enters him and mingling with the images of sense, which are man's own contribution to the process, produces thought, its action being thus analogous to that of a ray of light, which, entering a medium, brings out its color and form.

This conception of the active intellect as a force coming from without has been followed by many other commentators with various additions and modifications,—by Themistius, Simplicius, Avicenna, Averroës (who makes the possible intellect separate also), and among the moderns Renan. It is an interpretation, however, which (as we shall see later in the case of

²⁷ *De Anima* III, 430 a 10–23—"Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὕλην ἐκάστω γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκείνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἷτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς. . . . καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμειγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνεργεῖα. . . ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίων."

Averroës) destroys the integrity of the individual nature, and for this very reason seems to be least in accord with the spirit of Aristotle, himself. St. Thomas Aquinas, on the contrary, the mediaeval Christian commentator, though he makes the active and passive intellect taken as one an entity separable from the body, never fails to identify them, even after death, with the individual personality to whom they belong.²⁸

But what indeed is Aristotle's meaning in this passage? If he intends to introduce, as so many of his interpreters suppose, a new metaphysical principle, which though universal in its nature is independently existent, it seems strange that he should have dismissed the matter in so hasty and summary a fashion, especially when it involves apparently a theory entirely at variance with all the rest of his philosophy. Yet he expressly states (425a30) that the soul follows the law of all the rest of nature, namely that it consists in the union of matter (the body and its images) and form (the activity of thought itself). To be sure it is not clear what is meant by the qualifying adjectives—χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμικτής—or again—ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀττῶν—in relation to the active intellect. But whatever the meaning of the passage, it does not seem possible that Aristotle intended to contradict the principle so often enunciated in the *Metaphysics* and elsewhere that: "mankind is the cause of mankind universally speaking," but that "there is no such thing as a universal man." For "it would seem impossible," he says in refutation of Plato's theory, "that a substance and that of which it is the substance should exist apart; how then could the ideas which are the substances of things exist apart from those things?"²⁹

On the whole the most satisfactory account of Aristotle's meaning (followed also in the main by Wallace), is to be found in Hicks' explanation of the passage in his introduction to the *De Anima*: "It is not unreasonable to suppose that determinations so unlike as 'pure potentiality' and 'incessant activity'

²⁸ See Chapter IV for fuller discussion of the theories of Aquinas and Averroës.

²⁹ *Metaphysics*, 991 b 1-3, "ἔτι δόξειεν ἂν ἀδύνατον εἶναι χωρὶς τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὐ ἡ οὐσία· ὥστε πῶς ἂν αἱ ἰδέαι οὐσῖαι τῶν πραγμάτων οὔσαι χωρὶς εἶεν;"

refer to the same thing under two different aspects. Each describes it abstractly, and to know the whole the two determinations must be combined . . . Apparently he made this thinking (sc. of the active intellect) latent. The intellect always thinks, but we do not remember. This then is what the attribute potential means as applied to the intellect; and this agrees with the conception of the powers or faculties of the soul in general, which are permanent possessions, all dormant and unconscious, until aroused to activity in consciousness."³⁰

At any rate this view preserves the unity of the individual, which is, as we have seen, the keynote of Aristotle's philosophy. It would be extraordinary indeed if he should violate this sovereign principle in the case of the human soul alone. We must agree therefore with Hicks and also with Wallace, who says that the two intellects "it must be remembered are not 'two reasons': they are merely different modes of viewing the work of reason."³¹ If then the active intellect be "deathless and eternal," so too is the passive intellect, as Rodier maintains,³² and so too is the individual.

We have followed thus in our analysis of Aristotle's psychology, a gradual development from the lowest to the highest stage of mind, manifesting itself in a series of converging tendencies. At each point of convergence we have a new and higher level of psychic life. Thus the uniting of sensations at a single focal point gives us the "common sense" by which we perceive the subject in which a variety of sense qualia inhere. The focusing of actual perceptions with those remembered from other and similar experiences gives us the faculty of imagination. And lastly the union of this faculty in its potential and receptive capacity with intellect, that power of abstracting and perceiving the form of *οὐσία* of things, gives us the *vous* or reason, which is the highest level reached in the expression of mind. The

³⁰ Hicks, *De Anima*, Introduction, p. 68-69.

³¹ Wallace, *Aristotle's Psychology*, p. 115.

³² G. Rodier, *Traité de l'Ame*, Vol. II, p. 460-462—"Ajoutons que la phrase qui suit, a, 18: ἀεὶ γὰρ . . . κτλ. suppose que l'intellect en puissance est, lui aussi, séparé, impassible, et sans mélange. Car la supériorité de l'agent sur le patient ne peut servir à démontrer que l'agent possède certaines qualités que si le patient les possède aussi; l'agent devant, en ce cas, les posséder *à fortiori*."

individual soul, therefore, is for Aristotle not a loose combination of spiritual atoms or parts, as it was in the philosophy of Plato, but the fusion of these into a single integral whole.

We have traced then a very significant development of ideas in relation to individuality or personality through three successive stages: first in the primitive community, whose vaguely defined ideas point toward absolute monism and pantheism, which makes the individual an unessential part of reality; secondly, in Plato's conception of an organic world, in which the individual finds reality not *per se*, but only as a citizen of the earthly and heavenly state; and lastly in the philosophy of Aristotle, where the soul of the individual is at least the centre of interest, though he (the individual) can be defined and understood of course only *sub specie aeternitatis*, under the universal nature of his kind.

III

THE HEBREW CONCEPTION OF THE PERSON
AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF ST. AUGUSTINE

Before proceeding to a consideration of the problem of personality as it appears in the writings of St. Augustine, it is well to consider the background of his doctrine in the Old and New Testaments. It is true, as has been pointed out in the introductory chapter of this study, that Christianity was the first religious faith to assert the real and intrinsic value of human personality as such. This belief, however, was not without its inspiration and foreshadowing in the history of Jewish thought. Two ideas indeed reveal themselves in a study of the sacred scriptures of the Jews, which have a direct bearing upon our problem. The first is the monotheistic conception of God as a person which they achieved; the second a highly developed code of ethical conduct bearing upon the relation of the individual to God, and bringing with it a very real sense of personal responsibility and an intimate mutual love and fellowship between Jehovah and man.

The God of the Hebrews stood alone: He tolerated the worship of no other deity; He recognized no pantheon. This was a conception of divinity that other religions rarely achieved. When they did, as in the Osiris cult of Egypt, it was the religion of the nobles and priests, an esoteric form, which sprang from and flourished along with a popular and widespread polytheism and nature worship, into which it was eventually reabsorbed. Judaism knew no esoteric circle; it was the religion of the whole people,—a truly democratic faith. The leaders and prophets, from Moses to Malachi, fought long and hard for the purity and integrity of this popular religion against the insidious encroachments of polytheism. Indeed the account of that struggle and its ultimate triumph is one of the most amazing miracles that the Bible records. The Baal worship of the neighboring Semites and the Isis cults of the Egyptians were constantly seducing to their worship individuals and even whole groups of Jews. Con-

quest and oppression and slavery scattered this people over all of eastern Asia; yet always there remained a devoted group, a remnant who kept alive the faith of the one and only true God.

This one and only true divinity, whose aloofness is clearly marked even in the earliest and most anthropomorphic conceptions of His nature, never became, like the supreme *îdée* of Plato, an impersonal and universal principle. When Philo sought to make Him so, he was untrue to the real spirit of Judaism. Jehovah for this people was always a person. The passing of the early tribal God was, therefore, the passing only of His physical nature; in all else, except in body, He was a lofty and ideal human individual.¹ The relationship of God to man, moreover, was on a high plane of mutual understanding and feeling, and the qualifications used to indicate that relationship were intimate and personal in their nature. Thus Abraham was called the "friend of God", and to Moses He spoke "face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend."²

God was indeed the friend of man with all that this implies. He was also a father, not only in the etymological sense of the word, a "giver of life," but one who nourishes and protects and watches over His children with a tender and loving care.³ God was the Shepherd of His flock. The Semites were a pastoral people, and the symbolism of the shepherd's care is one of the most beautiful elements of Judaism and Christianity: "For thus saith the Lord God; Behold I, even I, will both search my sheep, and seek them out. As a shepherd seeketh out his flock in the day that he is among his sheep that are scattered; so will I seek out my sheep, and will deliver them out of all places where they have been scattered in the cloudy and dark day . . . I will seek that which was lost, and bring again that which was driven away, and will bind up that which was broken, and will strengthen that which was sick."⁴ The tenderness of the divine shepherd here directly foreshadows the parables and teaching of Christ.

¹ *Isaiah* 40: 12-38.

² *Exodus* 33: 11; cf. *Isaiah* 41: 8; *Deuteronomy* 32: 9-12.

³ *Isaiah* 63: 16; 64: 8.

⁴ *Ezekiel* 34: 11, 12 and 16; cf. *Luke* 15.

The relation of mutual love and friendship thus established between the Creator and His creature man inspires in the latter, as we have said, a strong sense of individual responsibility and a recognition of rights and duties. The sense of individual responsibility finds illustration in two very significant passages: Though the suffering of the innocent for the guilty was recognized by the Jews,—and even imputed to Jehovah's will,⁵—nevertheless we find in their eschatology, and in the ideal state to which it looked forward, a solution of that stern necessity from the irrational tyranny of which Greek thought never entirely escaped. "In those days," says Jeremiah, the prophet, "they shall say no more, The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity: every man that eateth the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge."⁶ Again in the book of Deuteronomy we read: "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin."⁷

With such a conception of justice and the untransferable quality of guilt, it is not strange that human sacrifice should have disappeared early from Judaism, though it continued to flourish among the neighboring Semitic tribes. For we have seen that human sacrifice is peculiarly the expression of that point of view which regards the group and not the individual as real. To the person-regarding God of the Hebrews, therefore, such a practice was utterly abhorrent, and we find Him saying to the faithless Israelites who had gone over to the cult of Moloch: "And they have built the high places of Tophet, which is in the valley of the son of Hinnom, to burn their sons and their daughters in the fire; which I commanded them not, neither came it into my heart."⁸

All this of course prepares the way for the coming of the new religion, the very heart and centre of which is the luminous and ideal personality of the Christ, a personality whose humanity,

⁵ *Exodus* 20; also *Joshua* 7: 24-26.

⁶ *Jeremiah* 31: 29-30.

⁷ *Deuteronomy* 24: 16; *Ezekiel* 18—all.

⁸ *Jeremiah* 7: 31; cf. *Deuteronomy* 18:10.

blended with the old Judaic conception of divinity itself, becomes an approachable goal, an ideal, toward whom all who will, may turn and find in him the saviour of mankind. Christ was indeed from boyhood, deeply imbued with the teaching and tradition of the Hebrew Scriptures. Many of his ideas, his parables, the basis of his teaching and even his phraseology are to be found either directly given or implied, in the books of the Old Testament; as, for example, the figure of the shepherd, the prodigal son, the fatherhood and love of God, and last his keen sense of the unchanging quality of his own spiritual identity ("Before Abraham was I am")⁹ which like that of Jehovah, Himself, is destined to draw all men unto him. Christianity does not, therefore, represent a sharp break with Judaism on the value of the person as such; rather it is a natural organic outgrowth and fruition of the real essence and spirit of all that its implied in that religion.

Such then, from one point of view at least, is the background of St. Augustine's religious thought. But he was likewise deeply imbued with the spirit of Greek philosophy, especially Platonism, a *Weltanschauung* almost as inescapable in the learned world of his day as is the view of modern science in our own. How different these two elements are, we have already seen. For the religious philosophy of Judaism and Christianity alike is oriented toward the individual, while that of Platonic Idealism is oriented toward the organic cosmos. In the *Timaeus* it is the *world* which is fashioned by the creator in the image of himself, while in the simpler narrative of *Genesis*: "God created *man* in his own image, in the image of God created he him; . . ." ¹⁰

It remains for us then to see how nearly St. Augustine has succeeded in his attempt at a synthesis of these two divergent views.

The universe for St. Augustine is a logically coherent and organic whole,—a cosmos. Nature is an order instituted by God, and envisaged from the point of view of God, it is good. There is no evil then *per se* in nature. Every being, every event fits itself into the cosmic order to make a perfect and congruous

⁹ *John* 8: 58.

¹⁰ *Genesis* 1: 27.

whole, which is the effect of God's creative gesture, His will. What then is sin? It is a falling off from the ideal of that goal toward which every created thing tends, its final perfect form. As man conforms to this ideal in his own nature he finds happiness and justification; as he departs from and falls short of it he sins, thereby, losing happiness and finding by that very fact his punishment.¹¹ So far we have a pure Platonism.

But St. Augustine's further development of the problem of evil carries us beyond the Platonic view. The real source of sin, he tells us, is the evil will or intention.¹² It is true (as Aristotle says) that "all men seek the good and shun evil, but to one man one thing seems good, to another another."¹³ God, however, has given to man the capacity to see and choose the highest good, which if he fail to do, he sins by his own fault; for will is equally essential with knowing in order that a man may act.¹⁴ "The will, therefore, adhering to the universal and unchangeable good, effects man's first and greatest good, being itself, so to speak, a median good. But the will when turned away from the unchangeable and universal good, and perverted to its own particular good, or to some exterior or inferior good, sins . . . yet since this turning away or perversion is not forced, but is voluntary, the punishment of suffering which follows upon it is deserved and just."¹⁵

We may indeed conceive the matter thus: God, the Creator, having out of the fullness of His love, made heaven and earth,

¹¹ *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia*, (ed. J. P. Migne, Vol. I). *De Libero Arbitrio*, Book II, ch. 9, sec. 26: "Inquantum igitur omnes homines appetunt vitam beatam, non errant. In quantum autem quisque non eam tenet vitae viam quae ducit ad beatitudinem, cum se fateatur et profiteatur nolle nisi ad beatitudinem pervenire in tantum errat."

¹² *Ibid.*, Book I, ch. 11, sec. 21: "Nulla res alia mentem cupiditatis comitem faciat, quam propria voluntas et liberum arbitrium."

¹³ *Ibid.*, Book II, ch. 9, sec. 26: "Omnes . . . bonum appetunt et malum fugiunt; sed . . . aliud alii videtur bonum."

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Book I, ch. 12, sec. 25: "Deinde nisi velis ad sapientiam pervenire, sermo tecum de hujusmodi rebus non est habendus."

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Book II, ch. 19, sec. 53: "Voluntas ergo adhaerens communi atque incommutabili bono, impetrat prima et magna hominis bona, cum ipsa sit medium quoddam bonum. Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono, et conversa ad proprium bonum, aut ad exterius, aut ad inferius, peccat . . . quae tamen aversio atque conversio, quoniam non cogitur, sed est voluntaria, digna et justa eam miseriae poena subsequitur."

and with them all living creatures, from the lowliest forms of plant and animal life to man and the angels, gave likewise to the order of intelligent beings,—that is, men and angels,—the gift of free choice in the exercise of will, which is in itself a good.¹⁶ Since, however, the possession of this capacity to see and choose between right and wrong is a free gift from God, it does not therefore limit His omnipotence, nor does it make Him in any sense the author of evil. “We believe that from one God, all things which are have come into being, and yet we believe that God is not the author of sin.”¹⁷ For that impulse whereby the will is turned away from the unchangeable good cannot come from God. Having bestowed the gift of free will upon man, He leaves the full responsibility for its use with man, since even His divine foreknowledge of the result does not determine that result. God knows, in other words, that man will sin, but he does not will or foreordain it so.¹⁸

In the order of nature, however, the divine will has created a hierarchy of places, ranging from highest bliss, which is the lot of the good angels and the saints, to the eternal wretchedness of the damned. No individual is predestined or foreordained, it is true, to any one of these places, yet someone must inevitably be first and another last, as the result of their own effort and achievement.¹⁹ It is much the same condition that we find in a class of students: one must be at the head of the class, another at the end, while the rest range between according to grade and rank. It is not the master's fault if the careless or unfaithful student find himself the last, as it is certainly that student's own fault if he has failed by deliberate choice. For St. Augustine assumes that every man has within him, by the grace of God,

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Book II, ch. 18, sec. 48: “. . . sic liberam voluntatem sine qua nemo potest recte vivere, oportet et bonum, et divinitus datum, et potius eos damnandos qui hoc bono male utuntur, quam eum qui dederit dare non debuisse fatearis.”

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Book I, ch. 2, sec. 5: “Credimus autem ex uno Deo omnia esse quae sunt; et tamen non esse peccatorum auctorem Deum.”

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Book III, ch. 4, sec. 10: “Ita Deus neminem ad peccandum cogens, praevidet tamen eos qui propria voluntate peccabunt.”

¹⁹ *De Ordine*, Book II, ch. 4, sec. 12: “Tamen ea naturae ordo, nec quia necessaria sunt, deesse voluit, nec qui indecora, eminere permisit. Quae tamen deformia suos locos tenendo, meliorem locum concessere melioribus.”

the power to make of his life whatever he would have it be. Sin "since it is voluntary is placed within our control. If then you fear it, you must will it not to be; if you will it not to be, it will not be. What then is more secure than to live in this life, where nothing can happen if you will it not to be?"²⁰

Yet even the dullard at the end of the class,—inasmuch as we may assume this to be the most excellent of classes,—is happier far in that position than if the privilege of membership had never been accorded to him. It is better, says St. Augustine, to have failed and found eternal punishment one's lot than never to have known the privilege of living in God's good and perfect world. "Then why should not God be praised and praised in his ineffable glory, who when he made those souls that were destined to remain within the laws of justice, made also other souls who, He fore-saw, would either fall into sin or even persist in sin, since these too are far better than the souls which, because they have no rational and free choice of will, cannot sin?"²¹

God indeed suffered no external constraint in the creation of his universe; He owes nothing to us nor to any one of his creatures. If we are unwilling to turn to Him we are losers, but to Him it can mean nothing.²² God would be unperturbed, St. Augustine tells us, "even if all the angels fell into sin."²³

This is surely not the God whose concept we have seen de-

²⁰ *De Libero Arbitrio*, Book II, ch. 20, sec. 54: "Qui tamen defectus quoniam est voluntarius, in nostra est positus potestate. Si enim times illum, oportet ut nolis; si autem nolis, non erit. Quid ergo securius quam esse in ea vita, ubi non possit tibi evenire quod non vis?"

²¹ *Ibid.*, Book III, ch. 5, sec. 16: "Cur ergo non laudetur Deus, et ineffabili praedicatione laudetur, qui cum fecerit eas quae in legibus essent justitiae permansurae, fecit etiam alias animas, quas vel peccaturas vel in peccatis etiam perseveraturas esse praevidebat: cum et tales adhuc meliores sint eis, quae quoniam nullum habent rationale ac liberum voluntatis arbitrium, peccare non possunt?"

Cf. also *Ibid.*, Book III, ch. 6, sec. 18, and *De Civitate Dei* Book XI, ch. 27.

²² *De Civitate Dei* Vol. VII, Book X, ch. 5: "Non solum igitur pecore, vel qualibet alia re corruptibili atque terrena, sed ne ipsa quidem justitia hominis Deus egere credendus est, totumque quod colitur Deus, homini prodesse, non Deo. Neque enim fonti se quisquam dixerit profuisse, si biberit; aut luci, si viderit."

²³ *De Libero Arbitrio* Book III, ch. 12, sec. 35: "Sive nulla est melior rerum ordinatio, nisi potestas angelica naturae excellentia et bonitate voluntatis in dispositione universitatis superemineat, etiamsi omnes peccassent Angeli, nullam inopiam facerent ad regendum imperium suum Creatori Angelorum."

veloped in the old Hebrew literature, nor yet the New Testament image of a tender and loving Father, whose will it is not that one of His little ones should perish. It is rather the remote and ineffable *voûs* of Plato, of Aristotle and Plotinus. Nevertheless St. Augustine has retained, in all its sternness and dignity, the doctrine of the reality and weight of human responsibility. Of his own experience he says: "When I willed to do anything or not to do it, I was most certain that none other than I willed to do or not to do it, and thereon I perceived immediately that I was the cause of my own sin."²⁴ If he has retained this conviction at the expense of a complete coherence and unity in his thinking, it is because he was deeply aware of the supreme value set by Christianity upon the reality of the individual. In order that the individual should be real, virtue and sin—which result from a conscious and deliberate choice in individual behavior—must both have a real meaning. "For a thing that were performed without act of volition would not be either a sin or a just act . . . God, therefore, was bound to give free will to man."²⁵

From this we may infer that the universe could not be perfect unless it included within it rational and morally free beings. This freedom means an unconditioned power of choice for the individual. Such choice, however, implies the possibility of wrong choice, which involves sin. The corollary of free choice is the burden of responsibility which rests its heavy weight (of inescapable punishment for every wrong act) upon the individual alone; it can in no way be traced back to the divine giver of free will. Hence from the point of view of God and the universe, sin is in St. Augustine's philosophy a pure negativity,

²⁴ *Confessiones* Book VII, ch. 3, sec. 5: "Itaque cum aliquid vellem aut nollem, non alium quam me velle ac nolle certissimus eram, et ibi esse causam peccati mei jam jamque animadvertēbam."

²⁵ *De Libero Arbitrio* Book II, ch 1, sec. 3: "Non enim aut peccatum esset, aut recte factum, quod non fieret voluntate. Ac per hoc et poena injusta esset et praemium, si homo voluntatem non haberet liberam. Debuit autem et in supplicio, et in praemio esse justitia; quoniam hoc unum est bonorum quae sunt ex Deo. Debuit igitur Deus dare homini liberam voluntatem."

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Book II, ch. 20, sec. 54: "Motus ergo ille aversionis, quod fatemur esse peccatum, quoniam defectivus motus est, omnis autem defectus ex nihilo est, vide quo pertineat, et ad Deum non pertinere ne dubites."

the result of a deficient, not an efficient cause,²⁶ and its effect, which we call evil, being exactly balanced by suffering or retributive justice, is but a part of the beauty and harmony of the whole cosmic order.²⁷

We turn now to a more careful consideration of the Augustinian conception of Deity. St. Augustine frequently refers to God as a *fons vitae*, source of all light and life. Again He is likened to the sun, that luminary which, being itself remote and unaffected by any earthly perturbations, is yet the origin of all our light and warmth, and so of life.²⁸ The rays of this divine sun, streaming down to us and quickening us with their power, represent the goodness of God, the outpouring of His creative act and love,—His Holy Spirit,—and these rays converging in a single human individual give us the incarnate Logos, the wisdom of God, which is Christ. Such is his image of the Trinity.

St. Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity is indeed a significant

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Book III, ch. 9, sec. 26: "Si universitatis perfectionem complet etiam nostra miseria, defuisset aliquid huic perfectioni, si beati semper essemus. Quapropter si ad miseriam nisi peccando non pervenit anima, etiam peccata nostra necessaria sunt perfectioni universitatis quam condidit Deus. Quomodo ergo juste peccata punit, quae si defuissent, creatura ejus plena et perfecta non esset? Hic respondetur, non ipsa peccata vel ipsam miseriam perfectioni universitatis esse necessaria, sed animas in quantum animae sunt; quae si velint, peccant; si peccaverint, miserae fiunt. Si enim peccatis earum detractis miseria perseverat, aut etiam peccata praecedat recte deformari dicitur ordo atque administratio universitatis. Rursus, si peccata fiant, et desit miseria, nihilominus dehonestat ordinem iniquitas. Cum autem non peccantibus adest beatitudo, perfecta est universitas."

Cf. also *De Civitate Dei*, Book XI, ch. 18: "Neque enim Deus ullum, non dico Angelorum, sed vel hominum crearet, quem malum futurum esse praescisset, nisi pariter nosset quibus eos bonorum usibus commodaret, atque ita ordinem saeculorum tanquam pulcherrimum carmen ex quibusdam quasi antithetis honestaret. Antitheta enim quae appellantur, in ornamentis elocutionis sunt decentissima, quae latine appellantur opposita, vel quod expressius dicitur, contrapposita. . . . Sicut ergo ista contraria contrariis opposita sermonis pulchritudinem reddunt; ita quadam, non verborum, sed rerum eloquentia contrariorum oppositione saeculi pulchritudo componitur."

²⁸ *Confessiones*, Book VII, ch. 1, sec. 2: "Sicut autem luci solis non obsisteret corpus aeris hujus qui supra terram est, quominus per eum trajiceretur penetrans eum, non dirumpendo aut concidendo, sed implendo eum totum: sic tibi putabam non solum coeli et aeris et maris, sed etiam terrae corpus pervium, et ex omnibus maximis minimisque partibus penetrabile ad capiendam praesentiam tuam, occulta inspiratione intrinsecus et extrinsecus administrantem omnia quae creasti."

Cf. also *Soliloquia*, Book I, ch. 6, sec. 12: "Promittit etiam ratio quae tecum loquitur, ita se demonstraturam Deum tuae menti, ut oculis sol demonstratur . . . Deus autem est ipse qui illustrat."

one from the point of view of this study. For the three persons are one; he reiterates this again and again, and yet they are distinct. The unity of God must be held inviolate; but the three manifestations of Godhead are still to be recognized as real.²⁹ How then is this possible? St. Augustine's answer to the question is far from clear. For he tries to find a middle course between the extremes of monism or unitarianism, on the one hand, and pluralism and polytheism on the other. "And so," he tells us,

"we do not say that there are two principles or three, when we speak of God, as we may not say that there are two gods or three: although when speaking of each one of them, whether of Father, Son or Holy Spirit, we admit that each one individually is God; nor may we say, as do the Sabellian heretics, that he that is the Father is the same as the Son, and that the Holy Spirit is the same as the Father and the Son; but we say that the Father is the Son's Father, and that the Son is the Father's Son, and the Holy Spirit belongs to the Father and the Son, but is neither Father nor Son."³⁰

His solution, therefore, seems to make the *One* a truly organic unity, in which the three persons of the Trinity are included as functioning parts or organs. Each one would have thus its own definition and its own function, but neither the function nor the

²⁹ *De Civitate Dei*, Book XI, ch. 10, sec. 1: "Quod enim de simplici bono genitum est, pariter simplex est, et hoc est quod illud de quo genitum est; quae duo Patrem et Filium dicimus; et utrumque hoc cum Spiritu sancto unus est Deus: qui Spiritus Patris et Filii, Spiritus sanctus propria quadam notione hujus nominis in sacris Litteris nuncupatur. Alius est autem quam Pater et Filius, quia nec Pater est, nec Filius: sed, Alius dixi; non, Aliud; quia et hoc pariter simplex pariterque bonum est incommutabile et coeternum. Et haec Trinitas unus est Deus: nec ideo non simplex, quia Trinitas. Neque enim propter hoc naturam istam boni simplicem dicimus, quia Pater in ea solus, aut solus Filius, aut solus Spiritus sanctus; aut vero sola est ista nominis Trinitas sine subsistentia personarum sicut Sabelliani haeretici putaverunt; sed ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam quod habet, hoc est, excepto quod relative quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur. Nam utique Pater habet Filium, nec tamen ipse est Filius; et Filius habet Patrem, nec tamen ipse est Pater. In quo ergo ad se ipsum dicitur, non ad alterum, hoc est quod habet: sicut ad se ipsum dicitur vivens, habendo utique vitam, et eadem vita ipse est."

³⁰ *De Civitate Dei*, Book X, ch. 24: "Nos itaque ita non dicimus duo vel tria principia, cum de Deo loquimur, sicut nec duos deos vel tres nobis licitum est dicere: quamvis de unoquoque loquentes, vel de Patre, vel de Filio, vel de Spiritu sancto, etiam singulum quemque Deum esse fateamur; nec dicamus tamen quod haeretici Sabelliani eundem esse Patrem, qui est et Filius, et eundem Spiritum sanctum, qui est et Pater et Filius; sed Patrem esse Filii Patrem, et Filium Patris Filium, et Patris et Filii Spiritum sanctum nec Patrem esse nec Filium."

definition would be meaningful except in terms of the whole.³¹ The psychic nature of God is then three-fold: having first existence or being (the remote, immutable and ineffable Father); second, His knowledge or wisdom (the incarnate Logos or Christ); and last His will, the motive force (represented by the person of the Holy Spirit). These natures have an integral relation such that each may be predicated in turn of the others. For God not only *is* and *knows*, He likewise *knows His existence*; His *knowing is and wills*; His *will is and knows* unchangeably and immutably.³²

If this interpretation seem close to the dangerous ground of Arianism, St. Augustine avoids the danger by making the three persons co-equal and co-eternal in power and substance, though he seems sometimes to waver on this point in the case of the Holy Spirit.³³ "Behold that Trinity which Thou, my God, art appears to me as in a mystery, since Thou, O Father, in the Beginning of our Wisdom which is Thy Wisdom, born of Thee, equal and co-eternal with Thee, that is, in Thy Son, didst fashion the heaven and the earth."³⁴

The nature of the *One* is, therefore, a complete psychic entity; not the loose combination of elements which we found in Plato's tripartite division of the human and cosmic soul, nor yet the simple and undifferentiated *vous*, (except in so far as this is the nature of the first member of the Trinity), nor the unitarian conception in the old Sabellian heresy,—but rather a being much closer to the ideal of that distinct and real person which is the true Christian notion of God. St. Augustine's use of the name of God, however, is often somewhat confused; for it is made

³¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1035 b 15–25.

³² *Confessiones*, Book XIII, ch. 16, sec. 19: "Nam sicut omnino tu es, tu scis solus, qui es incommutabiliter, et scis incommutabiliter, et vis incommutabiliter. Et essentia tua scit et vult incommutabiliter, et scientia tua est et vult incommutabiliter, et voluntas tua est et scit incommutabiliter."

³³ *De Civitate Dei*, Book XI, ch. 24: "Utrum autem boni Patris et boni Filii Spiritus sanctus, quia communis ambobus est, recte bonitas dici possit amborum, non audeo temerariam praecipitare sententiam: verumtamen amborum eum dicere sanctitatem facilius ausus fuero, non amborum quasi qualitatem, sed ipsum quoque substantiam, et tertiam in Trinitate personam."

³⁴ *Confessiones*, Book XIII, ch. 5, sec. 6: "Ecce apparet mihi in ænigmate Trinitas, quod es Deus meus; quoniam tu, Pater, in Principio Sapientiae nostrae quod est tua Sapientia de te nata, aequalis tibi et coaeterna, id est in Filio tuo, fecisti coelum et terram."

sometimes to refer generically to each member of the Trinity indifferently, and again it denotes specifically either the first member alone, the Father, or else the organic and all inclusive *One*.

St. Augustine makes the same analysis for the nature of man as we have seen in the case of the Godhead;—first or lowest, is physical being or sense: second, knowledge or reason; and third, will, the motive force, whereby our knowledge gained from sense and reason is translated into conduct. But these three are not held to be discrete or loosely related parts of our human nature; they too, as in the case of God, must be closely interrelated and integrated in one common identity.

So we read that not only can we say of a man that he *is*, but we must say also that he *is knowing*; not only that he *knows*, but that he *knows that he is* and *that he wills*; not only that he *wills*, but that he *wills to be* and *to know*. Thus the three elements of our nature are inherently and inseparably one.³⁵

Being, says St. Augustine, is the primary datum of consciousness. I know that I am, and even if I were mistaken in that judgment, in order to err, I must be. For "without any deceptive imagination of fancies and illusions, to me it is most certain that I exist, and that this I know and love. Nor do I fear, as regards these truths, any arguments brought forward by the philosophers of the Academy, when they say: What if you err? For if I err, I am. Since he that hath no being cannot err."³⁶ This *etiãmsi fallor sum* is but another and earlier version of the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*. In all our knowing, therefore, and in all our willing we seek unity. The function of reason is to separate and reunite the data of experience until a clear-cut

³⁵ *Ibid.*, ch. 11, sec. 12: "Dico autem haec tria: esse, nosse, velle. Sum enim, et novi, et volo: sum sciens, et volens; et scio esse me, et velle; et volo esse et scire. In his igitur tribus quam sit inseparabilis vita, et una vita, et una mens, et una essentia, quam denique inseparabilis distinctio, et tamen distinctio, videat qui potest."

³⁶ *De Civitate Dei*, Book XI, ch. 26: ". . . sed sine ulla phantasiarum vel phantasmatum imaginatione ludificatoria, mihi esse me, idque nosse et amare certissimum est. Nulla in his veris Academicorum argumenta formido, dicentium, Quid, si falleris? Si enim fallor sum. Nam qui non est, utique nec falli potest: ac per hoc sum, si fallor."

notion results.³⁷ But it is not enough to perceive unity intellectually, we must experience it emotionally with our whole nature, by seeking to participate in it. This is the way to beatitude or happiness, because it leads directly to God, the Supreme *One* and is a purely individual matter. One man cannot be made happy by another's happiness; he must reach the goal himself by an exertion of his own will.

"For by truth and wisdom, which is common to all, all men are made wise and blessed, by cleaving to that [sc. unchanging good which is the highest good of man]. But one man is not made blessed by the beatitude of another, because even when he imitates that man in order that he may be blessed, he desires to be made blessed through the source by which he sees that man made blessed, namely through unchangeable and universal truth. Nor may one man become prudent by someone's else prudence, nor steadfast by another's steadfastness, nor temperate by another's temperance, nor is someone rendered just by another man's justice, but only by uniting his soul to those unchangeable patterns and beacons of virtue which remain incorruptibly in universal truth and wisdom itself."³⁸ Not only sin, therefore, but salvation as well is a matter of individual responsibility, which may not be shared with another. The way to blessedness indeed lies first of all in a sense of the unity and coherence of our

³⁷ *De Ordine*, Book II, ch. 18, sec. 48: "Quid autem discernendum est, nisi quod aut unum putatur et non est, aut certe non tam unum est quam putatur? Item, cur quid connectendum est, nisi ut unum fiat, quantum potest? Ergo et in discernendo et in connectendo, unum volo, et unum amo. Sed cum discerno, purgatum; cum connecto, integrum volo. In illa parte vitantur aliena, in hac propria copulantur, ut unum aliquid perfectum fiat. Lapis ut esset lapis, omnes ejus partes, omnisque natura in unum solidata est. Quid arbor? nonne arbor non esset, si una non esset? Quid membra cujuslibet animantis ac viscera, et quidquid est eorum e quibus constat? Certe si unitatis patiantur divortium, non erit animal."

³⁸ *De Libero Arbitrio*, Book II, ch. 19, sec. 52: "Veritate enim atque sapientia, quae communis est omnibus, omnes sapientes et beati fiunt, inhaerendo illi. Beatitude autem alterius hominis non fit alter beatus; quia et cum eum imitatur ut sit, inde appetit beatus fieri, unde illum factum videt, illa scilicet incommutabili communique veritate. Neque prudentia cujusquam fit prudens alius, aut fortis fortitudine, aut temperans temperantia, aut justus justitia hominis alterius quisquam efficitur; sed coaptando animum illis incommutabilibus regulis luminibusque virtutum, quae incorruptibiliter vivunt in ipsa veritate sapientiaque communi, quibus et ille coaptavit et fixit animum, quem istis virtutibus praeditum sibi ad imitandum proposuit."

own individual natures. Even animals feel this. In animals as well as in men pain is the sign of a threatened disorganization and destruction of this unity.³⁹

St. Augustine is deeply impressed with the grandeur and importance of the individual man;—so great is that importance that even the hairs of his head are numbered; how much more his thoughts and feelings.⁴⁰ The Manichaeans would divide this unity by asserting a dual nature in man, but dualism, says St. Augustine, leads to pluralism, and so to chaos and confusion.⁴¹ “Do not divergent impulses divide the heart of man, whenever we deliberate what object is most promising to seize upon? And all are good, and vie with one another, until at last one alone is chosen, by which the whole will, that was broken up into many impulses, is borne on again in a single united effort.”⁴²

This defence of the psychological unity of the individual, brings Augustine to touch at least upon what, to a Platonist must seem a very grave heresy. For we find him defending the claim of the body as contributing to the individual's unity. Traces of reason, he says, are to be found even in sense, at least in some of the senses; as for example, in sight and hearing, for beauty itself depends upon a rational element, the congruity of form and line. “Therefore, when we see something drawn with well balanced parts, it is not absurd to say that it looks reasonably. And again when we hear some sound well harmonized, we do not hesitate to say that it sounds reasonably.”⁴³

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Book III, ch. 23, sec. 69: “Dolor autem quem bestiae sentiunt, animarum etiam bestialium vim quamdam in suo genere mirabilem laudabilemque commendat. Hoc ipso enim satis apparet in regendis animandisque suis corporibus, quam sint appetentes unitatis. Quid est enim aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens?”

⁴⁰ *Confessiones*, Book IV, ch. 14, sec. 22: “Grande profundum est ipse homo, cujus etiam capillos tu, Domine, numeratos habes, et non minuuntur in te: et tamen capilli ejus magis numerabiles sunt quam affectus ejus, et motus cordis ejus.”

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Book VIII, ch. 10, sec. 23: “Nam si tot sunt contrariae naturae, quot voluntates sibi resistunt; non jam duae, sed plures erunt.”

⁴² *Ibid.*, sec. 24: “Nonne diversae voluntates distendunt cor hominis, cum deliberatur quid potissimum arripiamus? Et omnes bonae sunt, et certant secum, donec eligatur unum, quo feratur tota voluntas una, quae in plures dividebatur.”

⁴³ *De Ordine*, Book II, ch. 11, sec. 32: “Itaque, cum aliquid videmus congruentibus sibi partibus figuratum, non absurde dicimus rationabiliter apparere. Itemque, cum aliquid bene concinere audimus, non dubitamus dicere quod rationabiliter sonat.”

It is to be sure the incarnation of the Christ which makes this view possible for St. Augustine. For if God Himself could be clothed in a body and not thereby limit His divinity, surely the body may be given some part in that purification which unifies and leads the soul to blessedness. "This way (the Incarnation) purifies the whole man, and prepares the mortal nature in all its constituent parts for immortality. For in order that one purification might not be sought for that part which Porphyry calls the intellectual nature, another for that which he calls the spiritual nature, and yet another for the body itself, therefore, did our most true and powerful Purifier and Saviour take all upon him."⁴⁴ And again: "Far be it from this incorruptible God to fear the corruption of that man which He put on, or of those men with whom He conversed. For these two saving testimonies which He showed forth by His incarnation are of no small value, that neither could true divinity be contaminated by the flesh, nor that devils are to be considered our betters because they have no flesh. He is, as the Holy Scriptures declare, the mediator between God and man, the man Jesus Christ, concerning whose divinity, which is equal with the Father, and whose humanity, which is like unto ours, we may not here speak fittingly, on our own authority."⁴⁵

Thus St. Augustine's sense of the value of the individual and the reality and unity of the person, is well in accord with the Christian ideal, but with Plato he carries the principle too far, making the army, the nation and the universe an organic unit as

⁴⁴ *De Civitate Dei*, Book X, ch: 32, sec. 2: Haec via totum hominem mundat, et immortalitati mortalem ex omnibus quibus constat partibus praeparat. Ut enim non alia purgatio ei parti quaereretur, quam vocat intellectualem Porphyrius, alia ei quam vocat spiritualem, aliaque ipsi corpori, propterea totum suscepit veracissimus potentissimusque mundator atque salvator."

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Book IX, ch. 17: ". . . non enim parva sunt haec interim duo, quae salubriter sua incarnatione monstravit, nec carne posse contaminari veram divinitatem, nec ideo putandos daemones nobis esse meliores, quia non habent carnem. Hic est, sicut eum praedicat sancta Scriptura, Mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Jesus (1 Tim. 11: 5), de cujus et divinitate, qua Patri est semper aequalis, et humanitate, qua nobis factus est similis, non hic locus est ut competenter pro nostra facultate dicamus."

well.⁴⁶ Yet we find that he is often clearly aware of the dangerous tendencies of Platonism in this very matter. For he definitely rejects in the *Retractationes* a fundamental thesis of the Greek philosopher, the doctrine of metempsychosis. In the book *De Animae Quantitate*, he tells us, he has accepted Plato's explanation of the learning process as a remembering and a recalling, but "this is not to be understood as giving consent to the notion that the soul has had existence before, either here in another body, or in some other place, whether in a body or out of a body."⁴⁷ We have seen that the doctrine of reincarnation, like that of pantheism, with which it is usually allied, is really a negation of personality. It is, therefore, incompatible with the spirit of Christianity.

Again St. Augustine tells us that in Platonism, however beautiful and consonant with Christianity it may seem, we shall see no trace of the doctrine of the Incarnation,⁴⁸ we shall find no place for the words of Christ: "Come unto me all ye who are heavy laden, and I will give you rest."⁴⁹ Here indeed St. Augustine is very close to that mutual personal relationship, that friendship between God and man, which Platonism never conceived, and which Judaism and Christianity alone have given to the world. It is this which makes all the difference between Platonism and Augustinianism.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ *De Ordine*, Book II, ch. 18, sec. 48: "Populus una civitas est, cui est periculosa dissensio: quid est autem dissentire, nisi non unum sentire? Ex multis militibus fit unus exercitus: nonne quaevis multitudo eo minus vincitur, quo magis in unum coit?"

⁴⁷ *Retractationes*, Book I, ch. 8, sec. 2: "In quo libro illud quod dixi, *omnes artes animam secum atulisse mihi videri; nec aliud quidquam esse id quod dicitur discere, quam reminisci ac recordari* (cap. 20, n. 34), non sic accipiendum est, quasi ex hoc approbetur, animam vel hic in alio corpore, vel alibi sive in corpore sive extra corpus, aliquando vixisse."

⁴⁸ *Confessiones*, Book VII, ch. 9, sec. 14: "Item ibi [sc. Platoniorum in libris] legi quia Deus Verbum, non ex carne, non ex sanguine, non ex voluntate viri, neque ex voluntate carnis, sed ex Deo natus est. Sed quia Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis (Joan. 1: 1-14); non ibi legi."

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. 21, sec. 27: "Nemo ibi audit vocantem: *Venite ad me, qui laboratis.*"

⁵⁰ Windelbandt, W.—*History of Philosophy*, p. 278: "The soul is for him [St. Augustine]—and by this he rises far above Aristotle and also above the Neo-Platonists—the living whole of *personality*, whose life is a unity, and which, by its self-consciousness, is certain of its own reality as the surest truth."

St. Augustine stands pre-eminent among all the Patristic writers, not only because of his very real and precious contribution to Christian philosophy, but by virtue also of the age-long influence of his thought upon all succeeding generations of Christians. If the tradition ordinarily associated with his name (that of the Franciscan Order)⁵¹ has accentuated the Platonic and mystical element (the *via beata*) rather than the rational and systematic aspect of his teaching, he has inspired no less profoundly the thought of the great Dominican, St. Thomas Aquinas, whose conception of personality we shall seek to understand in the course of the next chapter. We shall see there the same insistence upon the function of the rational will as the determining factor in human conduct, and so of the independence and intrinsic value of the individual as such.

⁵¹ P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^e siècle*, p. 98.

IV

THE PERSON IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

St. Augustine's background in philosophy is, as we have seen, that of Platonism. St. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, like most of his contemporaries in thirteenth century Latin Europe, was inspired by the spirit of Aristotle. For Peripateticism from the very beginning of that century had forced its way, —though not without bitter opposition from the Church, —into all the centres of learning. It had come by way of Arabic Spain, along the devious route of many translations,² and with some spurious additions,³ revealing for the first time to Western Europe the magnificent accomplishment of Aristotle's whole work.⁴ The great Arabic commentator, Averroës, was eagerly accepted as the interpreter of the newly revealed philosophy, and so great was his prestige that like his master, the *Philosopher*, he was usually referred to as the *Commentator*, although Albert the Great and his illustrious disciple, St. Thomas, had likewise written commentaries on Aristotle, the latter with the aid of William of Moerbeke and his translation from the original Greek. Indeed the work of St. Thomas, forming as it does a synthesis between Christian thought and those aspects of Peripatetic philosophy which could be made compatible, is one of the outstanding achievements of the whole history of thought.

Aquinas' interpretation of Aristotle is, therefore, a Christian one. Averroës, while he seeks to explain his master's meaning faithfully, is largely influenced nevertheless by Eastern and Neo-Platonic modes of thought. Like the earlier commentators, Themistius and Alexander, he interprets the difficult passage of the *De Anima* which deals with the active intellect as referring

¹ *Ibid.*, ch. 1.

² J. E. Renan, *Averroës et l'averroïsme*.

³ e. g., the *Liber de Causis*.

⁴ The only book of Aristotle's previously known was the *Logic* with Porphyry's famous commentary. Cf. Mandonnet, *Ibid.*, p. 11: "Jusqu'aux dernières années du XIII^e siècle, le mouvement philosophique de l'Occident fut donc l'oeuvre de la seule logique d'Aristote."

to an external and independent existent, a kind of *over-soul*, in which the individual participates and in which his identity is lost. This over-soul, which is really not only the active but the passive intellect as well, at least that aspect of it which Averroës calls the *hylic* intellect, is very similar in its nature to the Alexandrian Logos, and is an external and self-existent entity.⁵ It unites itself to men, by extracting the *species intelligibilis* (the purely conceptual form) from the *virtus imaginativa* (the *φαντασία* of Aristotle or the faculty of imagination). The intelligible form becomes thus a connecting term between sense and the transcendent reason, while sense and reason, apart from this conceptual form, have no other common ground. As has been shown in a recent dissertation on this question, the relation of this independently existent intellect, which is one and the same for all men, with the individual thinking mind is essentially inexplicable.⁶

As a matter of fact indeed such a relation is quite impossible. We must deny the reality of one or the other, and Averroism logically ends in a denial of the reality of the individual thinker. The truth of this may be seen in a popular form of the doctrine which found acceptance in Latin Europe. For although the subtleties of Averroës' metaphysical speculations were beyond the reach of those not trained in philosophy, the moral or rather amoral consequences of the doctrine were calculated to make their appeal to the popular fancy. We learn this from William of Tocco (according to P. Mandonnet): for "to William, Averroism is particularly identified with the theory of a single intelligence common to all men, a notion which carries with it the denial of all individual merit. The minds of even simple folk were imbued with this error. Thus a soldier in Paris declared he was unwilling to do penance for his sins; for he said: 'if the soul of the blessed St. Peter be saved, mine likewise shall be; having the same intelligence, we shall have also the same destiny.'"⁷

⁵ P. S. Christ, *Psychology of the Active Intellect of Averroës*, p. 21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

⁷ Mandonnet, *Ibid.*, p. 103.

It is not strange, therefore, that this doctrine of Averroës, destroying as it does the reality of the individual and with it all individual moral responsibility, should have found a bitter opposition among those who rightly conceived the meaning of Christianity. And none was greater among these, in his influence and depth of insight, than the illustrious Dominican father, St. Thomas of Aquin. We shall see in the following paragraph how clearly St. Thomas perceived the fallacy of Averroës' reasoning and the evil consequences of his doctrine.

"Certain men" he tells us, "who have conceded that thinking is the actuality of a spiritual substance, have denied that that spiritual substance is united to the body as its form. Among these Averroës taught that the possible (*i. e.*, hylic) intellect is in its *esse* separate from the body; yet he saw that unless there were some union between this and an individual man, its action would not belong to the individual man. For if there be two substances wholly disunited, it cannot be said that one is made to function when the other acts or functions. Whence he assumed that intellect, which he said was entirely separate in its *esse* from the body, to be united to an individual man through the *phantasmata*, for this reason, namely that the intelligible form (the *species intelligibilis*) which is the perfection of the possible intellect, is founded upon the *phantasmata*, from which it is abstracted. Thus it has a dual existence; one in the possible intellect, of which it is the form, and one in the *phantasmata*, from which it is abstracted. Now the *phantasmata* exist in the individual man, because the faculty of imagination (*virtus imaginativa*) is a faculty having its existence in the body; *i. e.*, having a bodily organ. The intelligible form itself, therefore, is the medium which conjoins the possible intellect to the individual man. But this conjunction is by no means sufficient to explain the fact that this individual man thinks. For as Aristotle says in the *De Anima*, Book III (com. 38 and 39) the *phantasmata* are related to the possible intellect as is color to sight. The intelligible form, therefore, when abstracted from the *phantasmata*, exists in the possible intellect in the same way that the form of color exists in the sense of sight; but the intelligible form exists in the *phantasmata*, as the visible form exists

in the color of a wall. For the reason, however, that the visible form, which is the form of sight, is founded upon the color of the wall, vision is not united to the wall as to a thing which sees, but as to a thing which is seen. For the wall does not see because of this, but is seen. This does not cause anyone to have knowledge, namely that he has in him a form, the likeness of which exists in a cognitive faculty, but that he has in himself a faculty of cognition. Nor, therefore, will this man be intelligent because there are within him *phantasmata*, the likeness of which, *i. e.*, the intelligible form, is in the possible intellect; it would rather follow from this that his *phantasmata* are the cognitions of others. But it must be that the possible intellect itself, which is the potentiality of thinking, inheres in this man as his form, in order that this man may think.”⁸

The doctrine of the separated possible intellect is, therefore, for St. Thomas illogical and without reasonable foundation. More than this it is essentially unchristian in its implication,

⁸ Sancti Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestiones Disputatae cum Quodlibetis* (Parma ed.), *Quaestio Unica de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Art. II (*Respondeo*), “Quidam vero concedentes quod intelligere sit actus spiritualis substantiae: negaverunt illam spirituales substantiam uniri corpori ut forma. Quorum Averroës docuit intellectum possibilem, secundum esse, separatum a corpore; vidit tamen quod nisi esset aliqua unio ejus ad hunc hominem, actio ejus ad hunc hominem pertinere non posset. Si enim sint duae substantiae omnino disjunctae, una agente vel operante, alia non dicitur operari. Unde posuit intellectum illum, quem dicebat separatum omnino secundum esse a corpore, continuari cum hoc homine per phantasmata, hac ratione, quia species intelligibilis, quae est perfectio intellectus possibilis, fundatur in phantasmatibus a quibus abstrahitur. Sic ergo habet duplex esse; unum in intellectu possibili, cujus est forma; et aliud in phantasmatibus, a quibus abstrahitur. Phantasmata autem sunt in hoc homine, quia virtus imaginativa est virtus in corpore, idest habens organum corporale. Ipsa ergo species intelligibilis est medium conjungens intellectum possibilem homini singulari. Sed haec continuatio nullo modo sufficit ad hoc quod hic homo singularis intelligat. Ut enim Aristoteles dicit in lib. 3 de Anima (com. 38 et 39), phantasmata comparantur ad intellectum possibilem sicut color ad visum. Sic igitur species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus abstracta, est in intellectu possibili, sicut species coloris in sensu visus; sic autem est in phantasmatibus intelligibilis species sicut species visibilis est in colore parietis. Per hoc autem quod species visibilis, quae est forma visus, fundatur in colore parietis, non conjungitur visus parieti ut videnti sed ut viso; non enim per hoc paries videt, sed videtur. Non enim hoc facit cognoscentem, ut sit in eo forma cujus similitudo est in potentia cognoscente; sed ut sit in ipso cognoscitiva potentia. Neque igitur hic homo per hoc erit intelligens quod sunt in eo phantasmata, quorum similitudo, quae est species intelligibilis, est in intellectu possibili; sed sequitur per hoc quod sua phantasmata sint aliorum intellecta. Sed oportet ipsum intellectum possibilem, qui est potentia intelligens, formaliter inesse huic homini ad hoc quod hic homo intelligat.”

since it denies the reality of personality and of individual responsibility. "That this opinion is contrary to the faith it is easy to see; for it takes away the rewards and punishments of the future life."⁹ Nor is this doctrine applied to the active intellect alone—though it be perhaps more reasonable¹⁰—any more consistent with Christian teaching. For such an assumption would not only destroy the reality of the individual, but would deny the possibility of any direct relation between God and His creatures. The active intellect or Logos would thus become the mediator between God and man, even in the act of creation, a point of view which is not sustained by the authority of either the Old or the New Testament. It is God and He alone, that has given the active intellect to man, though God Himself is not in any sense the active intellect.

"Some indeed have said that this (sc. active) intellect is the lowest of the separate substances, which by their light are joined with our souls. But this in many ways is contrary to the truth of our faith. First indeed, because since this intellectual light pertains to the nature of the soul, it comes from that source alone by which the soul's nature is created. But God alone is the creator of the soul, and not some separate substance, which we call an *angel*; for it is clearly stated in the first chapter of *Genesis* that God Himself breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life. Wherefore it follows that the light of the active intellect is not caused in the soul by some other separate substance, but directly by God. Secondly, because the final perfection of every agent consists in being able to attain its first cause (*principium*). Now the final perfection or beatitude of man is relative to the functioning of the intellect, as the Philosopher likewise says in *Ethics* IV (Book X, ch. 7 and 8). If then the first cause and source of intelligence in men were some other separate substance, it would follow that a man's final beatitude is grounded in that other created substance, and those

⁹ *Ibid.*, Article IX, (*Respondeo*): "Quod autem haec positio sit contraria fidei, facile est videre; tollit enim praemia et poenas futurae vitae."

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Quaestio Unica de Anima* Art. V, (*Respondeo*)⁸ ". . . intellectum agentem esse unum et separatum plus videtur rationis habere quam si hoc de intellectu possibili ponatur."

who hold this opinion clearly assume such to be the case; for they assume that the final happiness of man consists in being conjoined to the active intellect. The true faith, however, declares that the final beatitude of man is in God alone, as we find in John 17:3: *And this is life eternal,—that they might know Thee the only true God*; and that in the participation of this kind of beatitude men are the equals of the Angels, as it is written in Luke 10. Thirdly, because if man should participate in the light of intelligence through an Angel, it would follow that as regards his intellect man would not be in the image of God Himself, but in the image of the Angels . . . Hence we say that the light of the active intellect of which Aristotle speaks, is impressed upon us directly by God, and by means of this we discern true from false and good from evil . . . So then that which makes actual in us the objects of thought (*intelligibilia*) after the manner of a participated light, *is a part of the soul, and is multiplied in proportion to the number of souls and men*. Now that which makes the objects of thought intelligible, after the manner of the illuminating sun, is *one and separate*, namely God . . . But this separate first cause of our knowing cannot be cognized through the active intellect of which the Philosopher speaks, as Themistius says it can (*De Anima*, III, com. 36 of the Commentator), because *God is not in the nature of the soul*; but the active intellect is called by Aristotle a light received in our souls from God, and so it follows that we must say in an absolute sense, that the active intellect is not one for all men.”¹¹

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Art. X, (*Respondeo*): “Quidam enim dixerunt hunc intellectum esse infimum substantiarum separatarum, quae suo lumine continuantur cum animabus nostris. Sed hoc multipliciter repugnat veritati fidei. Primo quidem, quia cum istud lumen intellectuale ad naturam animae pertineat, ab illo solo est a quo animae natura creatur. Solus autem Deus est creator animae, non autem aliqua substantia separata, quam Angelum dicimus; unde significanter dicitur Genes. 1, quod ipse Deus in faciem hominis spiravit spiraculum vitae. Unde relinquitur quod lumen intellectus agentis non causatur in anima ab aliqua alia substantia separata, sed immediate a Deo. Secundo, quia ultima perfectio uniuscujusque agentis est quod possit pertingere ad suum principium. Ultima autem perfectio sive beatitudo hominis est secundum intellectualem operationem, ut etiam Philosophus dicit 4 Ethic. (lib. 10, cap. 7 et 8). Si ergo principium et causa intellectualitatis hominum esset aliqua alia substantia separata, oporteret quod ultima hominis beatitudo esset constituta in illa substantia creata; et hoc manifeste ponunt ponentes hanc positionem; ponunt enim quod ultima hominis felicitas est continuari

Thus clearly we perceive the belief of St. Thomas as regards both God and man. Each is a true and independent reality, whose identity, even in the mystical relation of beatitude, is never confused or merged. His thought, therefore, is completely free, as St. Augustine's was not entirely, from the concept of a pantheistic all, which entails the absorption and negation of human personality as such.

Again St. Thomas comes to the defense of individuality in that controversy, wherein he took part on more than one occasion with his fellow clerics of the order of St. Francis, on the "unity of forms." We know through John Peckham, then Archbishop of Canterbury and a Franciscan, that St. Thomas joined in the public debates of the university of Paris, known as the *Quodlibeta*, on the question raised concerning "the intellectual soul as a single substantial form in man."¹² Now the Franciscan Order had preserved, as we have seen, the old Augustinian tradition. They had retained, however, and developed that aspect of St. Augustine's philosophy which we have already noted in our study as the heritage of his Platonic background.¹³ Among other things they taught,—so Mandonnet tells us,—that prime matter is not, as Aristotle asserted, a pure potentiality, but the lowest of real substances, containing within it the "seminal

intellectui agenti. Fides autem recta ponit ultimam beatitudinem hominis esse in solo Deo, secundum illud Joan. 17: 3: *Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum*; et in hujusmodi beatitudinis participatione homines esse Angelis aequales, ut habetur Lucae 10. [The reference here seems to be to Luke 20: 36]. Tertio, quia si homo participaret lumen intelligibile ab Angelo, sequeretur quod homo secundum mentem non esset ad imaginem ipsius Dei; sed ad imaginem Angelorum, contra id quod dicitur Genes. 1, 26: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*, idest ad communem Trinitatis imaginem, non ad imaginem Angelorum. Unde dicimus, quod lumen intellectus agentis, de quo Aristoteles loquitur, est nobis immediate impressum a Deo, secundum quod discernimus verum a falso, et bonum a malo, . . . Sic igitur id quod facit in nobis intelligibilia actu per modum luminis participati, est aliquid animae, et multiplicatur secundum multitudinem animarum et hominum . . . Non autem potest hoc unum separatum nostrae cognitionis principium intelligi per intellectum agentem, de quo Philosophus loquitur, ut Themistius dicit (3 de Anima, com. 36 apud Commentatorem), quia Deus non est in natura animae; sed intellectus agens ab Aristotele nominatur lumen receptum in anima nostra a Deo; et sic relinquitur simpliciter dicendum, quod intellectus agens non est unus in omnibus."

¹² Mandonnet, *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

principles" (*rationes seminales*) of all things. They defended Platonic Realism, moreover, on the ground of the Aristotelian *principium individuationis*, that of matter and form, by asserting that spiritual substances also had each its appropriate matter, and might, therefore, be individuated. Among such spiritual substances the human soul is to be placed.¹⁴ Thus since it has a true hylomorphic individuation in its spiritual nature, it neither individuates nor is individuated by the body, which has its own *principium individuationis*, namely the vital principle or animal nature. This view is quite consonant with Platonism, it is true, but we recognize easily that it is not Augustinian; for we found St. Augustine expressing a directly contrary opinion in his opposition to Manichaeism.¹⁵

Indeed he is much closer to the spirit of St. Thomas himself, as we shall see in following the argument of the latter against the Franciscan doctrine. For it is impossible, St. Thomas tells us, that two substantial forms should at the same time perfect the same matter.¹⁶ This is true in the whole realm of nature. We cannot say that two forms inhere in the same matter, even when that matter is undergoing transformation and change. The moment the new form comes the old one *ipso facto* is destroyed. Otherwise we should have to say that opposites may exist in the same place at the same time, which is contrary to the first principles of Aristotle.¹⁷

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹⁵ Cf. chapter III, note 33 and 34. Cf. also M. de Wulf, *Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale*, p. 320: "Des théories qui sont étrangères à l'augustinisme, et de provenance juive ou arabe. Telles, la pluralité des formes dans un même être, et cette autre doctrine, inspirée d'Avencebrol, que les substances spirituelles sont composées de matière et de forme."

¹⁶ *Opuscula, De Pluralitate Formarum*, (2nd para., beginning: *Secundum primam viam*)—"Ergo impossibile est duas formas substantiales simul perficere eandem materiam."

Quaest. Disp., De Spiritualibus Creaturis, Art. III, (*Respondeo*): "Manifestum est ergo, quod si multiplicarentur multae formae substantiales in uno individuo substantiae, individuum substantiae non esset unum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, sicut homo albus."

¹⁷ *Opuscula, De Pluralitate Formarum (Nono et ultimo arguitur)*: "Si ergo duae formae ejusdem generis simul perficerent idem subjectum, opposita simul inessent eidem subjecto. Puta, si in eodem subjecto esset albedo et rubedo, denominaretur idem subjectum per rubedinem non album, et per albedinem album; et ita esset album et non album. Hoc autem est oppositum primi principii."

Quaest. Disp., De Spiritualibus Creaturis, *loc. cit.*—"Sed haec positio, secundum vera Philosophiae principia, quae consideravit Aristoteles, est impossibilis."

[Of the *Opuscula* cited in this and the following paragraphs, P. Mandonnet (v. *Opuscula Omnia*, Paris, 1927) cites as spurious the *De Pluralitate Formarum*, the *De Potentiis Animae* and the *De Concordantiis*. Parallel references, however, cited in notes 16, 17, 19, 20 and 37 show that these were, if not the work of St. Thomas himself, at least well in accord with the latter's point of view on the question of the individual.]

In the case of the human individual, therefore, the soul may not be regarded as an extraneous appurtenance, coming at birth from without and returning at death to the place whence it came. It is rather the true entelechy or actuality of the body, and man is, therefore, himself indivisibly one. We may indeed say that the soul is the form of the body in the same sense that heat is the form of that which is heated.¹⁸ The dead body is then a different body from the living one, because it does not (under the natural order) yield to the direction of the soul. The moment death comes the body is no longer a body in the same sense;—it is in course of transmutation to other forms, namely those of the elements.¹⁹ We may not argue, therefore, that since, when the soul passes, the body still has a form, though it be a dead body, therefore in life we must acknowledge a two-fold form for the individual. For if the body have a form *sui generis* other than the soul, then the soul would have to be regarded as an accident of the body (in the Aristotelian sense, κατὰ συμβεβηκός, which applies to all the predicates of a thing except the οὐσία or form). But no one would admit that the soul is not a substance (οὐσία),

¹⁸ *Opuscula, De Pluralitate Formarum*, (5th para., beginning: *Ad hoc dicendum*): "Et similis est modus loquendi cum dicitur, anima est actus corporis, ac si diceretur, calor est actus calefacti."

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, loc. cit. "Unde ex hoc quod non est aliqua potentia naturalis quae possit disponere corpus mortuum ad actum vitae, sequitur quod ipsum non est potentia respectu talis actus, et per consequens etiam non est idem corpus secundum formam, quod fuit vivum; illud enim corpus vivum erat potentia respectu animae, secundum quod anima dat esse vivum et ulteriores perfectiones, licet materia sit ejus potentia, secundum quod constituit esse substantiale et esse corporeum, sicut dictum est."

Quaest. Disp. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, loc. cit. "Et quia materia nunquam denudatur ab omni forma; propter hoc quandocumque recipit unam formam, perdit aliam, et e converso."

hence it would have to be substance and accident with respect to the same thing at the same time, which is absurd.²⁰

St. Thomas (or rather the author of a work long attributed to St. Thomas, and consonant with his philosophy, but spurious according to P. Mandonnet), approaches in this connection the question of the reality of organic parts, developing a little further the Aristotelian analysis in Zeta of the *Metaphysics*. "One form," says this author in the *De Concordantiis*, "constitutes an animal in all the ways in which it can be constituted: hence unless there are diverse organs, as many as it of necessity requires, it does not become an animal through any of its parts. Wherefore no part of a perfect animal is an animal either actually or potentially."²¹ In the case of certain lower organisms, it is true that living matter may be subdivided so that two or more new entities emerge. But even in this case it is only a potential pluralism that exists in the individual organism. The worm, until it is divided, is one worm, though it has, because of the simplicity of its functions, the capacity for becoming two. In the case of the higher animals, however, such a persistence of life in separated segments is in no instance possible.

The *sine qua non* of an individual being, therefore, is that it shall neither compose nor be composed of other individuals. "So we say that in this particular man there is no other substantial form except the rational soul, and that through this not only

²⁰ *Opuscula, De Pluralitate Formarum* (5th para. beginning: *Sequitur de secunda via*)—"Accipit enim quod anima est prima perfectio corporis, sicut ipse (sc. Commentator) dicit in definiendo animam: et ex hoc sequitur, quod non sit aliqua forma prior, per quam sit corpus. Si enim esset aliquis actus prior, subjectum animae esset compositum ex materia et forma; et ita anima esset accidens, secundum differentiam quam prius assignavit inter substantiam et accidens, nec haberet corpus esse per animam; quod cum sit impossibile, relinquitur quod sit prima perfectio corporis, ita quod nulla sit prior in corpore, et quod subjectum ejus nullum esse habeat nisi per ipsam, sed indigeat anima ut sit in actu."

Quaest. Disp., De Spiritualibus Creaturis, loc. cit. "Manifestum est autem quod quaelibet forma substantialis, quaecumque sit, facit ens actu, et constituit; unde sequitur quod sola prima forma, quae advenit materiae, sit substantialis; omnes vero subsequenter advenientes sint accidentales."

²¹ *Opuscula, De Concordantiis* (*Quaest. utrum anima sit tota in toto, et in quolibet ejus parte*) ". . . unde una forma est constituens animal omnibus modis quibus constitui potest: unde nisi fuerint diversa organa, quot ipsa necessario requirit, non fieret animal per aliquid ejus: unde nulla pars animalis perfecti est animal nec actu nec potentia."

is a man man, but he is animal and body and substance and being."²² There results then this seeming paradox: that the higher the organic unity is in the scale of being, the greater is the diversity of functions which it unites, "not as a composite (*composite*)" like the Aristotelian "heap" but as a unit (*unite*), like the syllable. An example of this—one that we have already noted in the *De Anima*—is the *sensus communis* or common sense, which "as one faculty is extended to all the objects of sense that the particular senses apprehend according to their different powers."²³

Human personality is, therefore, the supreme unification of many different powers, representing many lower stages and levels of life. Thus: "The more perfect the agent the more perfect the form it produces; hence the more perfect form engenders at one level (*per unum*) all the functions which lower forms engender at various levels (*per diversa*), adding a new element (*et adhuc amplius*) as e.g., if the form of the inanimate body gives being and bodily existence to matter, the form of a plant also gives this same thing to matter and in addition it gives life; the sensitive soul, moreover, gives this and something more, namely sensitivity; while the rational soul gives all these qualities and yet another, that is rationality . . . So Aristotle says in the second book of the *De Anima* (com. 31 and 33) that the vegetative soul is in the sensitive and the [intellectual soul is in the vegetative], as the triangle is in the tetragon and the tetragon is in the pentagon, for the pentagon contains the tetragon potentially; for it has this and also something else . . . Thus the intellectual soul contains potentially the sensitive, since it has this and something more; yet it is not for this reason

²² *Quest. Disp., De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Art. III (*Respondeo*): "Sic ergo dicimus quod in hoc homine non est alia forma substantialis quam anima rationalis; et quod per eam homo non solum est homo, sed animal, et vivum, et corpus, et substantia et ens."

²³ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.* "In virtutibus autem activis et operativis hoc invenitur quod quanto aliqua virtus est altior, tanto in se plura comprehendit, non composite, sed unite; sicut secundum unam virtutem, sensus communis se extendit ad omnia sensibilia, quae secundum diversas potentias, sensus proprii apprehendunt."

two souls." Rather it is the more truly one as it comprises a more and more complex variety of functions.²⁴

St. Thomas's approach to the problem of individuation is vaguely prophetic of Kant. He accepts the Aristotelian dictum that it is matter which causes the diversity of individuals who fall under the same form or species. But he carries his analysis a bit further than did Aristotle. "The form is made an individual through the fact that it is received in matter. But since matter considered in itself is indefinite (*indistincta*), it is not possible that it should individuate the form received into itself, except in so far as it is received in this or that definite matter, which is determined with respect to the here and now, the *hic et nunc*."²⁵

St. Thomas proceeds at length to define the first of these, the *haec materia* or individuating matter. It is not prime matter, as we have seen, since that could determine nothing. Nor is it a matter under definite dimensions (*i. e.*, the propiæ matter), since these definite dimensions may change and the individual remain the same. It is, however, a matter of indefinite boundary, "in the nature of pure dimension" (*in natura dimensionis tantum*). This middle term between prime and propiæ matter seems to correspond very nearly to our own idea of space, which is more than the pure potentiality of Aristotle's *materia prima*,

²⁴ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.* "Perfectionis autem agentis est inducere perfectionem formam; unde perfectior forma facit per unum omnia quae inferiores faciunt per diversa, et adhuc amplius; puta, si forma corporis inanimati dat materiae esse, et esse corpus; et forma plantae dabit ei et hoc, et insuper vivere; anima vero sensitiva et hoc, insuper et sensibile esse; anima vero rationalis et hoc, et insuper rationale esse . . . Unde etiam Aristoteles in 2 de Anima (com. 31 et 33) dicit, quod vegetativum est in sensitivo, et intellectivum est in vegetativo* (we should expect here *et sensitivum est in intellectivo*), sicut trigonum in tetragono, et tetragonum in pentagono; pentagonum enim virtute continet tetragonum: habet enim hoc et adhuc amplius: (non autem quod seorsum in pentagono sit id quod est tetragoni, et id quod est pentagoni proprium, tamquam duae figurae). Sic etiam anima intellectiva virtute continet sensitivam, quia habet hoc, et adhuc amplius; non tamen ita quod sint duae animae."

(* All editions consulted show the same reading—*Opera Omnia*, Paris 1875, *Quaest. Disp.* 1884.)

²⁵ *Opuscula, In Librum Boethii de Trinitate Expositio*, Quaestio IV, Art. II (*sic igitur*): "Unde forma fit hic per hoc quod recipitur in materia. Sed cum materia in se considerata sit indistincta, non potest esse quod formam in se receptam individuet, nisi secundum quod est distinguibilis. Non enim forma individuetur per hoc quod recipitur in materia, nisi quatenus recipitur in hac materia, vel illa distincta, et determinata ad hic et nunc."

and is not limited or defined by any particular dimension. It would be unwise indeed to push too far this chance resemblance to Kant's famous principle; for St. Thomas of course does not hold that such a matter as he defines here is purely subjective and psychical, a form of the *Gemüt*, which is imposed upon external reality. Yet still less would he agree with the Leibnitzian opponents of Kant that the principle of individuation is determined by the concurrence of attributes. For he says very definitely: "Other accidents, however,"—other, that is, than these indefinite dimensions of matter—"are not a principle of individuation, but are the principle of recognizing a distinction among individuals." We may perceive, for example, that this man is black and that man white, but in neither case does black or white have any part in making the man an individual.²⁶

In the case of time (the *nunc*), however, which St. Thomas in this particular treatise (the *In Librum Boetii de Trinitate Expositio*) does not define, the case is perhaps different. It is the

²⁶ *Ibid.*, loc. cit. "Materia autem non est divisibilis nisi per quantitatem; unde Philosophus dicit 1 Physic., quod submotâ quantitate, remanet substantia indivisibilis. Et ideo materia efficitur haec et signata, secundum quod est sub dimensionibus. Dimensiones autem istae possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo secundum earum terminationem: et dico eas terminari secundum terminatam mensuram et figuram; et sic ut entia perfecta collocantur in genere quantitatis, et sic non possunt esse principium individuationis: quia cum talis dimensionum terminatio varietur frequenter circa individuum, sequeretur quod individuum non remaneret idem numero semper. Alio modo possunt considerari sine ista determinatione in natura dimensionis tantum, quamvis nunquam sine aliqua determinatione esse possint: sicut nec natura coloris sine determinatione albi et nigri, et sic collocantur in genere quantitatis ut imperfectum. Et ex his dimensionibus interminatis efficitur haec materia signata; et sic individuat formam, et sic ex materia causatur diversitas secundum numerum in eadem specie . . . Alia vero accidentia non sunt principium individuationis, sed sunt principium cognoscendi distinctionem individuorum: et per hunc modum etiam aliis accidentibus individuat attribuitur."

Cf. M. D. Roland-Gosselin, O. P., *Le "De Ente et Essentia" de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, ch. XI. This author points out that St. Thomas, up to the moment of writing the *Contra Gentiles*, very definitely makes use of this concept of *dimensio interminata* (which he borrowed from Averroës), but "cette théorie averroïste ne reparaît plus jamais à partir du *Contra Gentiles*." (P. 109) . . . "Pour expliquer un silence aussi inattendu et un changement aussi radical à propos d'un point de doctrine emprunté à Averroës, l'on pourrait être tenté de soupçonner un incident de la lutte anti-averroïste, et de croire saint Thomas obligé de renoncer à une utilisation compromettante . . . Il me semble plutôt que l'explication véritable doit être prise de l'approfondissement par saint Thomas de sa doctrine, alors si contestée, de l'unité de la forme substantielle, ainsi que l'a compris Capréolus." (P. 110).

opinion of F. P. Clarke, in his dissertation on the *Intellect in the Philosophy of St. Thomas*²⁷ that the "concept of time is derived from inner experience." The primary datum of our experience of time is the nunc or the present moment. "*Nihil est accipere in actu de tempore nisi nunc.*" This is born of the nature of thought and is imposed upon the world of sense experience, in the case of motion, as a standard of measurement. If this be true, then on one side at least, the principle of individuation for St. Thomas is very close to that of the Kantian co-ordinates.

The question of independent existence, however, in the case of the human soul presents a double problem. We have seen that the soul is the true form of the body, but being such it cannot be regarded in itself as an individual. For form must exist "in something else, namely the matter, of which it is the actuality and perfection."²⁸ Hence it would seem that a spiritual substance could not be regarded as the form of a body, since such a substance is for St. Thomas a *hoc aliquid*, an individual and a *per se potens subsistere*.²⁹ But to this order of independently existing and individuated substances the human soul does belong, although it is the lowest of them all.³⁰ How then can it be the form of the body?

What St. Thomas means by the individuation of spiritual substances is nowhere made very clear. They are, we are told, composed of their propiarte form or actuality and a certain potentiality, which is certainly not to be identified with matter, and may perhaps be understood as the measure of their imper-

²⁷ P. 27.

²⁸ *Quaest. Disput., De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Art. II (*Respondeo*): "Formae autem debetur esse in alio, idest in materia, cujus est actus et perfectio; unde contra rationem substantiae spiritualis esse videtur quod sit corporis forma."

²⁹ *Ibid.* *Quaestio Unica de Anima*, Art. I (*Respondeo*): "Relinquitur igitur quod anima est hoc aliquid, ut per se potens subsistere; non quasi habens in se completam speciem, sed quasi perficiens speciem humanam ut forma corporis; et sic similiter est forma et hoc aliquid."

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Art, VII (*Respondeo*, 2nd para.): "Unde quanto aliqua substantia immaterialis fuerit primo agenti propinquior, tanto in sua natura simplici perfectiorem habet bonitatem suam, et minus indiget inhaerentibus formis ad sui completionem; et hoc quidem gradatim producit usque ad animam humanam, quae in eis tenet ultimum gradum. . . ."

fection or falling short of that supreme ideal and pure actuality which is God Himself.³¹

The nature of potentiality in the disembodied soul is, however, a little clearer. The soul indeed not only informs the body as its perfection or entelechy, but it extends beyond the limitations of body, since as pure intellect it has no bodily organ. A portion of the soul, therefore, is by its very nature always apart from matter, and thus the power of the soul exceeds the capacity of its body.³² From its bodily associations, however, it stores up a certain treasury, as it were, of sense impressions and memories, which pass into the intelligible form. These it carries with it into the life after death. If this were not true, the reward of merit and the punishment of sin would be of no avail, and heaven and hell alike would be stripped of their meaning.

"It is clear then that the powers of the sensitive soul are in the composite (or living body) as in a subject; but they are from the soul (*i. e.*, *qua* active faculties) as from their first cause. When the body is destroyed, therefore, the sensitive powers are also destroyed, but they remain in the soul as in their first cause."³³ This makes possible for the separated soul a remem-

³¹ *Ibid.*, Art. VI (*Respondeo*, 2nd para.): "Nihil ergo prohibet esse aliquam formam a materia separatam, quae habeat esse, et esse sit in hujusmodi forma. Ipsa enim essentia formae comparatur ad esse sicut potentia ad proprium actum. Et ita in formis per se subsistentibus invenitur et potentia et actus, in quantum ipsum esse est actus formae subsistentis, quae non est suum esse. Si autem aliqua res sit quae sit suum esse, quod proprium Dei est; non est ibi potentia et actus, sed actus purus. Et hinc est quod Boethius dicit in lib. de Hebdomadibus, quod in aliis quae sunt post Deum, differt esse et quod est; vel sicut quidam dicunt, quod est et quo est. Nam ipsum esse est quo aliquid est, sicut cursus est quo aliquis currit. Cum igitur anima sit quaedam forma per se subsistens, potest esse in ea compositio actus et potentiae, id est esse et quod est, non autem compositio materiae et formae."

³² *Ibid.*, *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Art. IV, (*Respondeo*, 2nd para.): "Relinquitur ergo quod secundum totalitatem essentiae simpliciter enuntiari possit esse tota in qualibet corporis parte, non autem secundum totalitatem virtutis; quia partes difformiter perficiuntur ab ipsa ad diversas operationes; et aliqua operatio est ejus, scilicet intelligere, quam per nullam partem corporis exequitur. Unde sic accepta totalitate animae secundum virtutem, non solum non est tota in qualibet parte, sed nec est tota in toto: quia virtus animae capacitatem corporis excedit, ut supra dictum est."

³³ *Ibid.*, *Quaestio Unica de Anima*, Art. XIX (*Respondeo*): "Manifestum est ergo quod potentiae partis sensitivae sunt in composito sicut in subjecto; sed sunt ab anima sicut a principio. Destructo igitur corpore, destruuntur potentiae sensitivae, sed remanent in anima sicut in principio."

brance of individual acts and things, since as pure intellect we could not know particulars, because these can be cognized only through the medium of sense. The knowledge of such individual things, therefore, remains in the disembodied soul in the form of a kind of intellectual memory; but the souls of the dead have no clear and direct knowledge of things happening upon earth after death.³⁴

The soul then is not pure intellect in the sense that God and the angels are such; since it carries with it even into its disembodied state a certain *habitus ad corpus*. St. Thomas is indeed keenly aware of the logical inconsistencies that underlie this view of the soul, as being at the same time the form of the body and in itself an independent individual. On the whole its most complete existence is to be found in connection with the body. "Since even though it can subsist by itself, it does not therefore have (in itself) a completed *species*, but the body is joined to it for the completion of its *species*."³⁵ It may be said indeed, from another point of view, that of faith,—“that the human body from the beginning was made in a certain sense incorruptible, and incurred through sin the necessity of dying, from which necessity it shall be freed again in the resurrection. Hence it is only *per accidens* that it does not attain to the immortality of the soul.”³⁶

For Aristotle it was human nature or the law of the eternal species which made the individual real, though the universal had in itself no separate existence. For Aquinas the individual himself is eternal and immortal, the equal of angelic beings, the

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Art XV (*Respondeo*, 4th para.): “Quando ergo anima erit a corpore totaliter separata, plenius percipere poterit influentiam a superioribus substantiis, quantum ad hoc quod per hujusmodi influxum intelligere poterit absque phantasmate, quod modo non potest; sed tamen hujusmodi influxus non causabit scientiam ita perfectam et ita determinatam ad singula, sicut est scientia quam hic accipimus per sensus.”

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Art. I (*Ad primum*) “. . . tum etiam quia etsi possit per se subsistere, non tamen habet speciem completam; sed corpus advenit ei ad completionem speciei.”

³⁶ *Ibid.*, (*Ad quintum*): “Potest tamen aliter dici secundum sententiam fidei, quod corpus humanum a principio aliquo modo incorruptibile constitutum est, et per peccatum necessitatem moriendi incurrit, a qua iterum in resurrectione liberabitur. Unde per accidens est quod ad immortalitatem animae non pertingit.”

well-beloved of God. And somehow in this immortality the body too is included.

We have already noted Aquinas' theory of psychology in the discussion about the unity of forms. Human nature is for him a complex of many different forces, which arise from the various levels of conscious life, beginning with the purely vital or vegetative functions, and culminating in two apparently equal faculties, intelligence and will. Indeed these are but two aspects of the same informing and dynamic principle which gives the individual his unity of being and purpose. For intelligence discovers the good which is the reason and end of all conduct, but will supplies the motive force, not only for the achievement of the end in view, but for the very act of intelligence itself.³⁷

The will, moreover, is free. As regards this freedom and the nature of evil, St. Thomas is well in accord with the view of St. Augustine, and not infrequently gives grateful acknowledgment to the authority of the Bishop of Hippo on this cardinal point of Christian doctrine. The freedom of the will, he tells us, arises from the nature of thought, which views the end or good under its universal aspect. Now it is the nature of a universal that it should include within it several concrete or particular cases, so that the intelligent will is always faced with a plural objective. It is the resulting equal balance of possible direction that checks the impulse which, in the case of instinct (or natural appetite), passes directly to its object, and we have the moment of deliberation which constitutes the essence of free choice. This freedom of choice is absolute and extends even to the relation of the soul with God. For a man may see the highest good, but he does not

³⁷ *Opuscula, De Potentiis Animae*, cap. VII,—“Voluntas autem respicit bonum sub universali ratione boni: et ideo non diversificantur in ea potentiae secundum diversas particularium bonorum rationes secundum concupiscibilem et irascibilem. Voluntas autem deliberativa et liberum arbitrium idem sunt.”

Quaest. Disp., Quaestio de Malo, Art. I (*Ad evidentiam*): “. . . sed objectum voluntatis est primum principium in genere causae finalis, nam ejus objectum est bonum, sub quo comprehenduntur omnes fines, sicut sub vero comprehenduntur omnes formae apprehensae . . . Si ergo consideremus motum potentialium animae ex parte objecti specificantis actum, primum principium motionis est ex intellectu: hoc enim modo bonum intellectum movet etiam ipsam voluntatem. Si autem consideremus motus potentialium animae ex parte exercitii actus, sic principium motionis est ex voluntate.”

therefore of necessity seek it, as Aristotle declares. It is possible indeed that a man may sin with the certain knowledge of what is right (*ex certa scientia*), and so he sins from pure wickedness (*ex malitia*).³⁸ Thus with Robert Browning St. Thomas might say of Christianity:

" 'Tis the faith that launched point blank her dart
At the head of a lie—taught Original Sin,
The corruption of Man's Heart."

But with this "corruption of Man's Heart" and its inevitable punishment goes a compensating conception of human dignity in the self-direction and freedom and complete responsibility of the individual.

If now we turn to the question of divine personality, we shall find it very close indeed to St. Thomas' conception of human nature. God the Father is, to be sure, as He was for St. Augustine, a remote and ineffable being, holding much the same relation to His universe as the self-thinking *Nous* of Aristotle.³⁹ But there is this significant difference. The Aristotelian deity has no touch with and no knowledge of the universe which springs from him as its prime mover. The Christian God of Aquinas—as His name of Father implies—is aware of and deeply concerned for the welfare of the world which He has created.

Some there are who assert that God has no knowledge of His creatures, the individuals that He has made:—for how, they ask, can a being who is pure spirit have knowledge of those whose identity depends upon matter alone? But these thinkers (as *e. g.*, the Averroists)⁴⁰ are in error; for God created matter as well as form, and He and the angels, who reflect His nature,

³⁸ *Ibid.*, *Quaestio III De Malo*, Art. XII (*Respondeo*): " . . . aliquando autem ex aliquo habitu, quando per consuetudinem inclinari in tale bonum, est ei jam versum quasi in habitum et naturam; et tunc ex proprio motu absque aliqua passione inclinatur ad illud; et hoc est peccare ex electione, sive ex industria, aut certa scientia, aut etiam ex malitia."

³⁹ *Summa Contra Gentiles* (Paris ed.) Book I, ch. XXX: "Non enim de Deo capere possumus, quid est, sed quid non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum, ut ex supradictis patet."—cap. XLVII (sec. 3): "Deus enim est et suus intellectus et sua essentia."

⁴⁰ Mandonnet, p. 167.

have a direct knowledge of particular things and persons as well as of the universal species. There is indeed no lowly creature upon whom God's attention and care are not freely bestowed, and this universal benevolence is a quality of Deity which man himself can and must emulate. For "in like manner we too should exercise care over each and every creature, to use each one of them in the way that God has ordained,"—lest in the day of judgment they appear against us as witnesses.⁴¹

One other distinctive aspect of the theodicy of St. Thomas must be noted. It is the element of will, which is present in the divine, as well as in human nature, being the necessary concomitant of intelligence. God's will like man's is free, within, however, the bounds and limitations of rationality⁴² and the necessity of His own most perfect being.⁴³ "For man by the fact that he has free-will is said to be the master of his own acts. But this in the highest degree befits the First Mover, whose act does not depend upon anything or anyone else. Therefore, God Himself has free-will."⁴⁴ This action of the divine will is indeed like that of the craftsman, who produces the work of his craft, not of neces-

⁴¹ *Quaest. Disput., Quaestio Unica de Anima*, Art. XX (*Respondeo*, 1st para.) "Communis quidem difficultas est ex hoc quod intellectus noster non videtur esse cognoscitivus singularium, sed universalium tantum; unde cum Deo et Angelis et animae separatae non competat aliqua cognoscitiva potentia nisi solus intellectus, difficile videtur quod eis singularium cognitio adsit. Unde quidam intantum erraverunt, ut Deo et Angelis cognitionem singularium subtraherent; quod est omnino impossibile. Nam hoc posito, providentia divina excluderetur a rebus, et iudicium Dei de humanis actibus tolleretur; auferrentur etiam et ministeria Angelorum, quos de salute hominum credimus esse sollicitos."

Opuscula, De Divinis Moribus, Cura Dei de Creaturis: "Aliis est mos Dei, quod ipsi cura est de omnibus creaturis tam de minimis quam de maximis, animalibus natalibus, volatilibus, etiam de passeribus, quorum duo veneunt dipondio, nec unus est in oblivione coram Deo. Item de magnis et parvis vermibus. Haec enim omnia in esse conservat, eisque vitae necessaria continue subministrat . . . Similiter et nos curam gerere debemus quarumlibet creaturarum, ut singulis secundum Dei ordinationem utamur, ne in die iudicii ipsas in malitiae nostrae testimonium habeamus."

⁴² *Contra Gentiles*, Book I, ch. LXXXIII, sec. 4: "Si igitur Deus, volendo se, vult aliquid aliud a se, necessarium est eum velle omne illud quod ad volitum ab eo de necessitate requiritur; sicut necessarium est Deum velle animam rationalem esse, supposito quod velit hominem esse."

⁴³ *Ibid.*, ch. LXXX.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, ch. LXXXVIII, sec. 4: "Praeterea, Homo, per hoc quod habet liberum arbitrium, dicitur suorum actuum dominus. Hoc autem maxime competit primo agenti, cujus actus ab alio non dependet. Ipse igitur Deus liberum arbitrium habet."

sity,⁴⁵ but by a deliberative choice, after he has taken cognizance of the various possibilities which the general notion or definition of his art subsumes.⁴⁶ It must be remembered, moreover, that God's will, as it is free itself, does not impose necessity upon our human action, a point of view which may be defended on the ground of the Aristotelian notion of contingency.⁴⁷ Indeed the supreme expression of God's will is love,—an attractive force acting as the final cause or good, but permitting of a defection or voluntary turning away on the part of man himself.

It is in the incarnation, however, that divine personality finds its closest and most significant touch with humanity. "For what greater good-will could there be than that the Creator of all things were willing to communicate Himself to the things He had created? And this benignity of His was great in the joining of Himself with all things by His presence; it was greater in that He communicated Himself to the good through grace; but it was greatest because He communicated Himself to Christ the man, and thus to all classes of individuals in the unity of the person."⁴⁸

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, ch. LXXXI, sec. 5: "Amplius, Res procedunt a Deo, sicut artificata ab artifice . . . Sed artifex, quamvis velit se habere artem, non tamen ex necessitate vult artificata producere. Ergo nec Deus ex necessitate vult alia a se esse.

⁴⁶ *Quaest. Disput., De Malo*, Quaest. VI, Art. I (*Respondeo*, 2nd para.): ". . . unde cum actus sint in singularibus, in quibus nullum est quod adaequet potentiam universalis, remanet inclinatio voluntatis indeterminate se habens ad multa; sicut si artifex concipiat formam domus in universali sub qua comprehenduntur diversae figurae domus, potest voluntas ejus inclinari ad hoc quod faciat domum quadratam vel rotundam vel alterius figurae."

⁴⁷ *Contra Gentiles*, Book I, ch. LXXXV, sec. 4: "Praeterea, Necessitas ex suppositione in causa non potest concludere necessitatem absolutam in effectu. Deus autem vult aliquid in creatura, non necessitate absoluta, sed solum necessitate quae est ex suppositione, ut supra (c. LXXXIII) ostensum est. Ex voluntate igitur divina non potest concludi in rebus creatis necessitas absoluta: haec autem sola excludit contingentiam; nam etiam contingentia ad utrumlibet redduntur ex suppositione necessaria, sicut Socratem moveri si currit est necessarium. Divina ergo voluntas non excludit a rebus volitis contingentiam; non igitur sequitur, si Deus vult aliquid, quod illud de necessitate eveniat, sed quod haec conditionalis sit vera et necessaria: Si Deus aliquid vult, illud erit consequens; tamen non oportet esse necessarium."

⁴⁸ *Opuscula, De Humanitate Christi*, Art. I, para. 2: "Quid enim benevolius, quam quod creator rerum communicare se voluit rebus creatis? et haec benignitas magna fuit in conjunctione sui cum omnibus rebus per praesentiam; major quia communicavit se bonis per gratiam; maxima quia se communicavit Christo homini, et per consequens generibus singulorum in unitate personae."

The Christ personality is, therefore, an ideal, a perfect human individual as well as the incarnate Deity, whom the Christian seeks to emulate and resemble, so far as he may, in the development of his own personality. Christ was both divine and human, yet there was no duality in his person. He was and is absolutely and indissolubly one. Many are the controversialists who have sought to deny this truth, either by breaking up the unity of Christ's person, or by denying the reality of either its divine or its human aspect. Among these even Origen is to be included, for he made the Son a created being, and thus a lesser substance than the first member of the Trinity. Wherefore, says St. Thomas, he may be reckoned as the authority of Arius, and the "father and source" of that heresy.⁴⁹

To them all St. Thomas replies in a defense of the Catholic faith: "We must say that in the Christ there is one nature, perfect and divine, a perfect human nature also, constituted of rational soul and human flesh; and that these two natures are united in Christ, not through a mere dwelling together (an *inhabitatio*), nor in any accidental sense, as a man is united to a garment, nor yet just in a personal *habitus* or property, but

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, In Libro Boethii de Trinitate, Quaest. III, Art. IV: "*Respondeo dicendum, quod Arianorum positio, inaequalitatem in divinis personis constituens, non est catholicae fidei confessio, sed magis gentilis impietas: quod sic patet. Apud gentiles enim omnes substantiae immortales dii dicebantur. Inter has autem dicebant vel ponebant Platonici tres personas principales, ut patet per Augustinum de civ. Dei lib. 10, et per Macrobius super somnium Scipionis: scilicet Deum omnium creatorem, quem dicebant tantum Patrem propter hoc quod ab ipso omnia deducebantur; et quamdam inferiorem substantiam, quam paternam mentem, sive paternum intellectum dicebant, plenam omnium rerum ideis, et hanc factam a Deo Patre dicebant; et post haec ponebant animam mundi quasi spiritum vitae totius mundi. Et has tres substantias tres principales deos nominabant, et tria principia, per quae animae purgarentur. Origenes autem Platoniciis documentis insistens, arbitratus est, hoc modo in fide ponendum esse; quia dicitur 1 Joan. ult. 7: 'Tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo:' sicut Platonici tres principales substantias posuerunt: unde posuit Filium esse creaturam et minorem Patre in lib. qui dicitur Periarchon, idest de principiis, ut patet per Hieronymum in quadam epistola de erroribus Origenis. Et cum ipse Alexandriae docuerit, ex ejus scriptis suum errorem Arius hausit: et per hoc dicit Epiphanius, quod Origenes fuit pater Aarii et fons.*"

after the manner of a single hypostasis or absolute individual (*suppositum*)."⁵⁰

In order to understand this union of divinity and humanity in the person of the Christ, we shall do well to follow the careful and clear analysis which St. Thomas gives us in the treatise: *De Unione Verbi Incarnati*. There are many words, he tells us, referring in general to the notion of individuation which must be distinguished in their meaning. Of these two general classes may be formed: 1, names of primary designation (*primae impositionis*), which indicate independent realities, and 2, names of secondary designation (*secundae impositionis*), as *e. g.*, *individual*, *subject* and the like, which indicate a measure of individuality without, however, completely independent existence. Some of these names apply only to substances, as in the case of *suppositum* and *hypostasis*, which can never be predicated of accidents, and *person*, which always refers to "an individual substance having a rational nature." Still others have a general application and refer to all classes of individuals, namely *particular*, *singular* and *individual* itself, and these may be applied even to accidents. Now a substance is that which exists absolutely (*per se*) and independently (*in se*), while accident is defined as that which exists in something else, namely in some substance. Hence we may not predicate of accidents the terms *suppositum*, *hypostasis* and *person*, which refer properly only to substances. Therefore these same terms may not be applied to the parts of a whole or to the organs of an organism, as *e. g.*, a hand; since parts or organs by their definition do not have an independent existence. (Cf. Z of the *Metaphysics*).⁵¹

⁵⁰ *Contra Gentiles*, Book IV, ch. XXXIX: "Ex supra dictis igitur manifestum est quod, secundum catholicae fidei traditionem, oportet dicere quod in Christo sit una natura divina perfecta, et human natura perfecta, ex anima scilicet rationali et humana carne constituta; et quod hae duae naturae unitae sunt in Christo, non per solam inhabitationem, neque accidentali modo, ut homo unitur vestimento, neque in sola personali habitudine et proprietate, sed secundum unam hypostasim et suppositionum unum."

⁵¹ *Quaest. Disput.*, *Quaestio Unica de Unione Verbi Incarnati*, Art. II (*Respondeo*, 2nd para.): "Ut igitur scire possit quid in talibus concedendum sit et quid negandum, considerandum est quod nominum ad individuationem pertinentium; sive sint nomina primae impositionis, sicut *persona* et *hypostasis*, quae significant res ipsas; sive sint nomina secundae impositionis, sicut *individuum*, *suppositum*, et hujusmodi, quae significant intentionem individuali-

It is somewhat in this latter sense that we may regard the humanity of Christ: "And so therefore because the human nature in Christ did not subsist *per se* and separately, but existed in something else, namely in the hypostasis of the Word of God, not indeed as an accident in a subject, nor yet properly speaking as a part within a whole, but through an ineffable assumption, therefore the human nature in Christ may be called indeed a kind of individual (*individuum aliquod*) or particular or singular, but it cannot be said to be an hypostasis or suppositum nor yet is it a person. Hence it follows that in the Christ there is only one hypostasis or suppositum (or person), namely that of the Divine Word."⁵²

From this point of view, therefore, we may conceive the incarnation as an organic unity, in which the human body and soul of Christ are included as an instrument or organ. If we ask, however, in what sense human nature, which we find nowhere else exemplified, except in individual men, could be united to another entity, in this case the Divine Word, as a merely organic part, we must answer either that we are dealing here with an inexplicable mystery, an "*assumptio ineffabilis*," or else we must carry our reasoning a step beyond that of St. Thomas. For if we

tatis; quaedam eorum pertinent ad solum genus substantiae, sicut *suppositum* et *hypostasis* quae de accidentibus non dicuntur, et *persona* in rationabili natura, et etiam *res naturae* secundum acceptionem Hilarii; quaedam vero pertinent ad individuationem in quocumque genere, sicut *individuum*, *particulare*, et *singulare*, quae etiam in accidentibus dicuntur. Est autem substantiae proprium, ut per se et in se subsistat; accidentis autem est in alio esse; et ideo illa nomina quae pertinent ad individuationem substantiae in illis solum locum habent quae per se et in se subsistunt; et propter hoc etiam de partibus substantiarum non dicuntur, quia non sunt in seipsis, sed in toto, quamvis non sint in subjecto; de quibus tamen dici possunt nomina ad individuationem pertinentia convenienter tam in substantiis quam in accidentibus: non enim potest dici quod haec manus sit persona, vel hypostasis aut suppositum; quamvis dici possit, quod sit aliquid particulare, singulare vel individuum. Manus enim et si pertineat ad genus substantiae; quia tamen non est substantia completa in se subsistens, non dicitur hypostasis aut suppositum, vel persona."

⁵² *Ibid.*, loc. cit. "Sic igitur, quia humana natura in Christo, non per se separatim subsistit, sed existit in alio, idest in hypostasi Verbi Dei, non quidem sicut accidens in subjecto, neque proprie sicut pars in toto, sed per ineffabilem assumptionem; ideo humana natura in Christo potest quidem dici individuum aliquod, vel particulare, vel singulare; non tamen potest dici vel hypostasis vel suppositum, sicut nec persona. Unde relinquitur, quod in Christo non est nisi una hypostasis vel suppositum, scilicet divini Verbi."

regard divinity as that infinitely far but approachable goal toward which human personality is oriented, the incarnation is but the realization, in the glorified person of the Christ, of the ideal of human and divine identity, for which we are eternally striving, but which, by the very nature of an ideal, we may never completely achieve.

Indeed St. Thomas tells us that nothing in our experience exemplifies so nearly this mystery of the incarnate Word as that of the union of body and soul in the human individual,—not so far, to be sure, as the soul is the form of the body; for the Logos could not exist as a form in matter,—but in so far as the soul in the act of thought exceeds the limitations of the body, and using it as an instrument, an organic instrument, however, and not something “extrinsic” or “adventitious,” is free.⁵³

From all this two conceptions stand out in striking clearness, the highest and noblest indeed that lie in our power to conceive; the one of the divine, the other of our human personality, and each alike is free, immortal and irreducibly one. “But that nature which *person* includes in its meaning is the most honorable of all natures, in that it is an intellectual nature according to its kind. In like manner also that mode of existence which person implies is most honorable, namely that something exists *per se*. Since then every attribute that is most honorable among His creatures ought to be attributed to God, the name of person may properly be attributed to the Deity, as well as all other names that are rightly predicated of Him.”⁵⁴

⁵³ *Ibid.*, Art I (*Respondeo*, 5th para.): “Relinquitur ergo quod humana natura non est unita Verbo neque accidentaliter neque essentialiter, sed substantialiter, secundum quod substantia significat hypostasim, et hypostatice vel personaliter. Hujus autem unionis exemplum in rebus creatis nullum est propinquius quam unio animae rationalis ad corpus, quod ponit Athanasius (in symbolo fidei). Non quidem secundum quod anima est forma corporis, quia Verbum non potest esse forma in materia; sed secundum quod corpus est animae instrumentum, non quidem extrinsecum et adventitium, sed proprium et conjunctum; unde Damascenus dicit (lib. 3, cap. 15), humanam naturam esse organum Verbi.”

Cf. St Augustine, *De Anima Quantitate*, Book I, ch. 34, sec. 77: “Nihil inter omnia quae creavit, Deo esse propinquius [anima].”

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, *De Potentia*, Quaestio IX, Art. III (*Respondeo*): “Natura autem quam persona in sua significatione includit, est omnium naturarum dignissima, scilicet natura intellectualis secundum genus suum. Similiter etiam modus existendi quem importat persona est dignissimus, ut scilicet aliquid

There is needed, however, for the continuous development of human personality, in accordance with its divine ideal, a proper and fostering *milieu*, a democratic society, where each individual is free to develop so far as he can the divine potentialities of his soul. And this is precisely the function of that great religious fellowship, the universal Christian or Catholic Church. The Christian religion, says St. Thomas, is in its broadest sense a universal religion, a catholic faith. First in the domain of the human individual himself, it is an all inclusive discipline. For it teaches that: "God is to be worshipped not only for the sake of eternal things, but also for temporal benefits; it directs men not only in things spiritual, but also in the use of that which pertains to the body, and promises blessedness for body and soul. Its rules are therefore called universal in that they include and regulate the whole life of a man and everything which in any sense pertains to him."⁵⁵

But not only is Christianity a religion of the whole man, it includes (ideally at least) within its universal dominion, the whole of human society as well, and is in this sense also a truly catholic faith. For "what is universally extended to all ought most of all to be called universal. But the Christian faith is extended to all men universally, as we see in the nineteenth verse of the last chapter of Matthew: 'Go ye therefore and teach all nations.' So Christianity ought rightly to be called catholic or universal."⁵⁶

Something of this conception is foreshadowed, it is true, even in the Old Testament, at least by the later prophets; but Israel on the whole was too deeply and persistently race conscious, too

sit per se existens. Cum ergo omne quod est dignissimum in creaturis, Deo sit attribuendum, convenienter nomen *personae* Deo attribui potest, sicut et et alia nomina quae proprie dicuntur de Deo."

⁵⁵ *Opuscula, In Libro Boethii de Trinitate, Quaest. III, Art. III (Respondeo)*: "Haec autem est religio christiana, ut Augustinus dicit ibidem [sc. *De Civitate Dei*]: ipsa enim docet Deum esse colendum non solum propter aeterna, sed etiam propter temporalia beneficia; nec solum in spiritualibus, sed etiam in usu corporalium hominem dirigit, et beatitudinem animae et corporis reponit. Et ideo regulae ejus universales dicuntur, utpote totam vitam hominis et omne quod ad ipsum quolibet modo pertinet, continentes et ordinantes."

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* (*Sed contra—Item 2*): "Quod universaliter omnibus proponitur, maxime debet dici universale. Sed fides christiana omnibus universaliter proponitur, ut patet Matth. ult. 19: 'Docete omnes gentes.' Ergo ipsa merito debet dici catholica vel universalis."

much aware of her position as a unique and chosen people among her idolatrous neighbors to have more than a dim and fleeting vision of such a universal society. Yet the germ of the Christian ideal was there, and united with a new understanding of the value and dignity of human personality, it has given us the very foundation of the ideal and truly democratic *ecclesia catholica* in its oldest and finest sense. Thus the Church offers her gifts to "all sorts and conditions of men," "not to the continent alone, as the Manichaeans do, but also to the married; not only to the guiltless, as in the case of the Novatiani, but likewise to the penitent, for whom the Novatiani say there is no salvation."⁵⁷

It is the duty of every Christian, moreover, to meet his fellow-man on the basis of his common humanity and individual worth alone. For if God be no respecter of persons, neither must they be who love Him and seek to be like Him. "In respect to social class (*conditione*), the masters form one group, the servants another; and as regards church membership, some are clergy and others are laity. In fortune some are rich, while others are poor, and so in the case of different distinctions among men. But as to these two commandments (Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart and with all thy soul and with all thy might; and thy neighbor as thyself) the first is universal, and the second is like unto it, laid without difference and without distinction upon all who share in the nature of reason and the exercise of free will."⁵⁸

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* Lectio I, (*Dicit ergo*): "Cujus nominis [sc. fidei catholicae] assignat [sc. Boetius] duas rationes, dicens: 'Tum propter praecepta universalium regularum:' praecepta enim quae fides catholica proponit, non unitantum genti observanda, sed omnibus proponit: in quo praecipue differt a lege Moysi, quae uni tantum populo praecepta ponebat. Similiter etiam singulae haereses suis tantum sectatoribus praecepta accomoda tradunt; sed fides catholica de omnibus curam gerens, omnibus praecepta accomoda tribuit, non solum continentibus, ut Manichaei, sed etiam conjugatis; et non solum innocentibus, ut Novatiani, sed etiam poenitentibus, quibus illi salutem denegant."

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* *De Dilectione Dei et Proximi*, *De Dil. Prox.*, ch. II: "In conditione, nam aliud dominos, aliud servos. In professione, aliud clericos, aliud laicos. In fortuna aliud divites, aliud pauperes; et sic de aliis hominum differentiis. Sed mandatorum primum generale est, et secundum simile illi, et sine differentia et distinctione obligans omnes naturam rationalem participantes, et libero arbitrio utentes."

V

PERSONALITY AS A DIVINE AND APPROACHABLE IDEAL

It would not be fair, however, to close a study of this sort without reference to another and very influential school of Christian writers, the mystics. At first glance their point of view seems entirely at variance with the one which we have sought to develop in the course of the last two chapters. Following the Platonic, or rather the Neo-Platonic tradition, and to a certain extent of course the spirit of Augustinianism, these thinkers have sought to minimize, and even sometimes to deny the value of individuality and personality in their eagerness to exalt the nature of the infinite and eternal God. They have conceived the divine nature not only as a transcendent being, but also as an immanent and all-pervading spirit, into which the individual human soul tends to be absorbed and in which it is likely to be lost. Not only the mystics themselves, from Eriugena on, have offered this interpretation of the nature of God, but certain schools of philosophy as well, notably that of Hegel and his followers.

Yet on the whole the spirit of Christian mysticism is very different from that of Indian (or Schopenhauerian) and other religious philosophies. For the experience toward which the Christian mystic aspires is not truly, except in rare instances, a denial and negation of his own personality, but rather an enlarging of his spiritual power and a spontaneous outpouring of himself in direct communion with his Creator. The essence of that communion is love, and for each man love expresses itself in an eager desire to know and to imitate the divine and ever approachable, yet ultimately unattainable ideal or goal,—that is God.

This seems indeed to be essentially the meaning of Frederick von Hügel in his book, the *Mystical Element of Religion*, when he says: "For only if we do not resist such Mysticism, do we gain and retain a vivid experience of how 'Consciousness of imperfection and the pursuit of perfection are alike possible to man

only through the universal life of thought and goodness in which he shares, and which, *at once an indwelling presence and an unattainable ideal, draws him on and always on.*' . . . "I would, however, guard here against any exclusion of a seeking or finding of God in Nature and in Conscience: only the contrary exclusion of the finding of God within the soul, and the insistence upon a complete separation of Him from that soul, are unacceptable in the Hebraic mood. For *a coming and a going, a movement inwards and outwards*, checks and counterchecks, friction, contrast, battle and storm, are necessary conditions and ingredients of the soul's growth in its sense of appurtenance to Spirit and to Peace.'¹

Von Hügel is striving here to unite two points of view which are, as we have seen, fundamentally irreconcilable. For he is making God a part of the soul, and at the same time an ideal or goal. What he refers to as the "Hebraic mood," however, is that which makes of God and man two separate and distinct realities. But this view is not, we know, exclusively Hebraic. It is Christian too. For St. Augustine testified to its truth when he likened the divine Creator to the remote but life-giving sun, the *fons vitae* of the physical heaven. From this sun the quickening rays,—that is, the love of God,—stream down and stir our natures to reach out toward Him, but God Himself is no more in our hearts than is the real sun, either as a whole or in part, included in the retinal image. And if we would find a yet more positive assertion of the real distinction between God and man, we have but to turn again to St. Thomas Aquinas, to his words already quoted: "Now that which makes the objects of thought intelligible, after the manner of the illuminating sun, is *one and separate, namely God* . . . But this separate first cause of our knowing cannot be cognized through the active intellect of which the Philosopher speaks, . . . because *God is not in the nature of the soul*; but the active intellect is called by Aristotle *a light received in our soul from God*,"—and so each is real and distinct.² It is not an absorption which the soul seeks, therefore, in com-

¹ F. von Hügel, *Mystical Element of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 330.

² See notes—Chapter III, note 28; Chapter IV, note 11.

munion with its Creator, but a being-like, an *imitatio*, a divine similitude, which does not preclude difference.³

Even von Hügel admits this. For the Christian mystic, he says, in the very moment of his ecstasy, is aware of a deep distinction, that of his own unworthiness and sin, between his soul and God: "If God is the deepest ideal, the ultimate driving force and the true congenital element and environment of Man, such as Man cannot but secretly wish to will deliberately, and which, at his best, Man truly wills to hold and serve: yet God remains ever simply incompatible with that part of each Man's condition and volition which does not correspond to the best and deepest which that Man himself sees or could see to be the better, *hic et nunc*; and again, He is ever, even as compared with any Man's potential best, infinitely more and nobler, and, though here not in simple contradiction, yet at a degree of perfection which enables Him, the Supreme Spirit, to penetrate, as Immanent Sustainer or Stimulator, and to confront, as transcendent Ideal and End, the little human spirit, *so great in precisely this its keen sense of experienced contrast*."

"Catherine (St. Catherine of Genoa) exhibits well this double

³ Cf. the closing lines of the last canto of Dante's *Paradiso* (trans. of Henry Francis Cary), for the kind of religious experience which does not imply absorption:

O eternal light!
Sole in thyself that dwell'st; and of thyself
Sole understood, past present or to come;
Thou smiledst on that circling, which in thee
Seemed as reflected splendor, while I mused;
For I therein, methought, in its own hue
Beheld our image painted: steadfastly
I therefore pored upon the view. As one,
Who versed in geometric lore, would fain
Measure the circle; and, though pondering long
And deeply, that beginning, which he needs,
Finds not: e'en such was I, intent to scan
The novel wonder, and trace out the form,
How to the circle fitted, and therein
How placed: but the flight was not for my wing:
Had not a flash darted athwart my mind,
And, in the spleen, unfolded what it sought.
Here vigor failed the towering fantasy:
And yet the will rolled onward like a wheel
In even motion by the love impelled,
That moves the sun in heaven and all the stars.

relation, of true contradiction, and of contrast, both based upon a certain genuine affinity between the human soul and God. On one side of herself she is indeed a veritable fish out of water; but on the other side of her, she is a fish happily disporting itself in its very element, in the boundless ocean of God. On the one side, snapping after air, in that seemingly over-rarefied atmosphere in which the animal man, *the mere selfish individual* cannot live; on the other side, expanding her soul's lungs and drinking in light, life, and love, in that same truly rich atmosphere, which Itself Spirit, feeds and sustains her growing spiritual personality."⁴

It would seem, however, that there is no inherent necessity, in this view, for accepting the notion of God as a "divine atmosphere" in which the creature is immersed, this "boundless ocean" of God. For the same result may be achieved and the substantial meaning of von Hügel's thought preserved, if we regard the relation between the divine nature and man as one of mutual love, an attractive force, drawing each toward each, and not an immersion or identification of one in the other. There is something essentially repulsive and unworthy in this likening of the divine nature to an ocean or medium, even in a partial sense; for with St. Thomas we must believe that, since the noblest achievement of human nature is personality, so God must be, in the highest sense of the word, a person. The "Hebraic mood" is, therefore, not the cold and repellent "Deism" that von Hügel conceives it to be, but a warm and mutual friendship between the soul and God.

St. Catherine herself must indeed have had something of this sort in mind when she said: "'If I were to see the whole court of heaven all robed in like manner, so that there would be no apparent difference between God and the angels: even then the love which I have in my heart would recognize God, in the same manner as does a dog his master.'"⁵ The recognition of love therefore, is the recognition of the person, the individual, not under any universal aspect, but as a unique and irreplaceable

⁴ von Hügel, p. 346-347.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 263.

reality; so that whatever we may agree to be the principle of individuation as such, the *principium* of personality is love. It is indeed this close personal relationship, this recognizing love of God, that is the theme of most devotional literature, whether it be found in the sublime sentiments of the *De Imitatione* of Thomas-à-Kempis, a churchman of highest distinction and honor, or in the simple faith of a Brother Lawrence, the kitchen boy of the *Carmelites Déchaussés*, who achieved a never failing sense of the constant presence of God, or whether it be in the *Confidences with God* of that young Italian soldier of our own day, Giosuè Borsi, who wrote the pages of his diary, communing each morning with his divine friend, amid the stress and turmoil of war.⁶

⁶ Thomas-à-Kempis, *De Imitatione Christi*, Book II, ch. VIII; sec. 2 and 3:

2. "Quid potest tibi mundus conferre, sine Jesu? Esse sine Jesu, gravis est infernus; et esse cum Jesu, dulcis paradiscus. Si fuerit tecum Jesus, nullus poterit nocere inimicus. Qui invenit Jesum, invenit thesaurum bonum imò bonum super omne bonum. Et qui perdit Jesum, perdit nimis multum, et plus quàm totum mundum. Pauperrimus est, qui vivit sine Jesu; et ditissimus, qui bene est cum Jesu.

3. Magna ars est, scire cum Jesu conversari; et scire Jesum tenere, magna prudentia. Esto humilis et pacificus, et erit tecum Jesus. Sis devotus et quietus, et manebit tecum Jesus. Potes fugare Jesum, et gratiam ejus perdere, si volueris ad exteriora declinare. Et si illum effugaveris et perdideris, ad quem fugies? et quem tunc quaeres amicum? Sine amico, non potes bene vivere; et, si Jesus non fuerit tibi prae omnibus amicis, eris nimis tristis et desolatus. Fatuè igitur agis, si in aliquo altero confidis aut laetaris. Eligendum est magis, totum mundum habere contrarium, quàm Jesum offensum. Ex omnibus ergò caris, sit Jesus solus dilectus specialis."

The Practice of the Presence of God, Conversations and Letters of Brother Lawrence (H. R. Allenson Ltd., London); p. 39-40: "That when he [Brother Lawrence] had thus in prayer filled his mind full with great sentiments of that *Infinite Being*, he went to his work appointed in the kitchen (for he was cook to the Society); there, having first considered severally the things his office required, and when and how each thing was to be done, he spent all the intervals of his time, as well before as after his work, in prayer.

That when he began his business, he said to God, with a filial trust in Him: "O my God, since Thou art with me, and I must now, in obedience to Thy commands, apply my mind to these outward things, I beseech Thee to grant me grace to continue in Thy Presence; and to this end, do Thou prosper me with Thy assistance, receive all my works, and possess all my affections."

As he proceeded in his work, he continued his familiar conversations with his Maker, imploring His grace, and offering to Him all his actions."

A Soldier's Confidences with God, Spiritual Colloquies of Giosuè Borsi (trans. by Rev. Pasquale Maltese), p. 25-26: "Thus while I talk here to Thee, I rejoice to feel that Thou art observing me with benevolent interest, bestowing on me watchful and unwearied attention, that nothing escapes Thee; nay, that it is I who am distracted, stupid, embarrassed, so that a good part of what

It follows then that personality is that which is perceived in another, rather than self-perceiving. It is, to be sure, a gathering together of all the complex incoming modes of experience at the highest level of conscious life, and this is what von Hügel perhaps means by the "ingoining movement" of experience. This is a great reservoir, coming not only from the immediacy of each moment, or even from the combined experiences of the individual's whole life, but from family and racial inheritance and from all the background of environment.⁷ Physiologists tell us that no element of experience, even those acquired at the lowest levels of life, is lost, so that the most primitive reactions, as *e. g.*, the mass-reflex, are held in a kind of suspension or tension, and may reappear in behavior when cortical control is lost.

But personality is far more than this; it is likewise an "out-going movement"—a spontaneous and creative act, by which the raw material of experience is organized and reconstructed into a progressively greater and more widely extended world-

I myself am saying escapes me. I feel that Thou makest up for my misery. Thou dost anticipate me, divining what I would say before I can express it, Thou even knowest it beforehand and better than I; Thou seest my intentions and Thou makest complete what I but hint at so fleetingly and badly. Thou art the best of Listeners, Thou art the sole Listener, the only Listener before Whom one loves to speak, the only calm, good, just, far-seeing kind Witness, before Whom it is a pleasure to act, the only judge Who cannot misunderstand. And what makes me feel free and puts me at my ease is the certainty that Thou canst never misunderstand me, that Thou seest my profound sincerity. Speaking does me more good than Thee; rather it is useful to me alone, for in speaking I am seeking only to understand and express myself. There art Thou before me, silent and smiling, watching and judging my efforts, and Thy mere presence makes me a thousand times more eager and willing; it sharpens my faculties a hundredfold. And little by little, O my Lord, I feel the joy of opening my heart to Thee, of laying bare my soul before Thee. What Socrates did with the youth Theaetetus, Thou doest with me, but far more generously, far more nobly, in that realm of the Spirit the doors of which Thou hast flung open by Thy bloody sacrifice."

Cf. also St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*: Book IX, sec. 3: "sed nobis est bene [quoting Porphyry] cum eum per justitiam et castitatem aliasque virtutes adoramus, ipsam vitam precem ad ipsum facientes, per imitationem et inquisitionem de ipso. Inquisitio enim purgat . . . imitatio deificat affectionem ad ipsum operando."

⁷ Cf. William Brown, *Mind and Personality*, p. 14: "Personality is the final differentiation which the individual has made, as it were, and produced in himself and superimposed upon all that he has inherited from past generations and lower forms of mental evolution . . . One may compare the mind to a pyramid or mountain ascending to an apex. Corresponding to the apex there is the conscious personality."

view. Herein lies the real difference between the Kantian solution of the epistemological problem and that of the English Empiricists. For the latter the passive reception of incoming simple sensations, building themselves up, as it were, on the blank surface, the *tabula rasa*, of the mind, was sufficient to explain experience. But for Kant the problems was more complex. He realized—as had Aristotle and St. Thomas before him—that the function of mind is two-fold, not only an ingoing passive function, but an outgoing movement as well, a responsive creative act.⁸ It is this latter aspect of mind, to which he gave the name *à priori*, and which bears a close analogy, at least, in its form-giving power, to that soul which “effects all things like a kind of stored up energy such as light”—the active intellect of Aristotle.

The two movements, however, are really one, and the fuller and more diverse the incoming tide, the more far reaching is the power of this outgoing creative act, which we may call by the name of understanding, whether it be of the so-called purely intellectual sort, or of the emotional and sympathetic type, or whether it be the understanding which comes with the uniting of these two, intellect and feeling, with will into the noblest of all insight, love. It is this outgoing movement, this spontaneous and creative act, which is, in the person of God, the divine ideal

⁸ I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Transzendentalen Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe* (nach Ausgabe A), zweiter Abschnitt, last para.: “Dass die Natur sich nach unserem subjectiven Grunde der Apperzeption richten, ja gar davon in Ansehung ihrer Gesetzmässigkeit abhängen solle, lautet wohl sehr widersinnisch und befremdlich. Bedenkt man aber, dass diese Natur an sich nichts als ein Inbegriff von Erscheinungen, mithin kein Ding an sich, sondern bloss eine Menge von Vorstellungen des Gemüts sei, so wird man sich nicht wundern, sie bloss in dem Radicalvermögen aller unserer Erkenntnis, nämlich der transzendentalen Apperzeption, in derjenigen Einheit zu sehen, um derentwillen allein sie Objekt aller möglichen Erfahrung, d. i. Natur heissen kann; und dass wir auch eben darum diese Einheit *a priori*, mithin auch als notwendig erkennen können, welches wir wohl müssten unterwegs lassen, wäre sie unabhängig von den ersten Quellen unseres Denkens an sich gegeben. Denn da wüsste ich nicht, wo wir die synthetischen Sätze einer solchen allgemeinen Natureinheit hernehmen sollten, weil man sie auf solchen Fall von den Gegenständen der Natur selbst entlehnen müsste. Da dieses aber nur empirisch geschehen könnte: so würde daraus keine andere, als bloss zufällige Einheit gezogen werden können, die aber bei weitem an den notwendigen Zusammenhang nicht reicht, den man meint, wenn man Natur nennt.”

of personality, and as we approach this goal, we are most truly persons.

Here is no mere "selfish individual" that von Hügel and others have feared to see in this evolution of the person.⁹ Mere self-consciousness is indeed a turning back or refraction of the natural impulse of spontaneity, which is thus crippled in its power of achievement, so that to be entirely concerned with self, would mean the destruction of that larger, but no less individual self, the person. We do not know ourselves so well, therefore, as we may know our fellows, and no man can be greater than another sees him to be, although that other may be God. There is no artist who has written a poem, painted a picture, composed a symphony, or solved a problem of logic or mathematics, but knows that sense of exaltation, that being lifted out of himself, which comes with the gesture of pure creation. To say that such a one is less himself, in this moment of his fullest self-expression, is certainly absurd.

It is only in moments, however, that even our greatest geniuses reach this supreme expression of self, which the historic person of the Christ held as his steadfast achievement. It was this sense of the infinite reach of his power, this recognition of divinity realized in a timeless immortality, which inspired his confident assertion: "Before Abraham was, I am." Here in this noblest of human lives, this glorious and luminous personality, who by the power of his limitless understanding and love, his recognition of merit and worth in even the humblest of men, is still able to draw countless multitudes of individuals to the eager warmth of his friendship, in this sublime personality of the Christ lies the supreme meaning of Christianity.

⁹ See above, note 4. Cf. also W. R. Inge, *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, ch. IV.

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